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ASSENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN






This Article is concerned with the adjudication of disputes
that relate to contract formation. In particular, it examines the use
of the objective test1 in the resolution of formation disputes, which
* Professor of Law, Northwestern School of Law, Lewis and Clark College. B.A., Uni-
versity of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa, 1968; LL.B., University of the
Witwatersrand, 1971; LL.M., University of Michigan, 1978.
Acknowledgment: I am grateful to Edward Brunet, Annette Mulee, Anthony Waters
and Juliana Wellman for their criticism of drafts of this paper.
See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 2-2, at 23-25 (1977). The
objective test is a contract law doctrine that requires the intention of a contracting party to
be determined by what a reasonable person in the position of the other party would inter-
pret the first party's manifestations to mean. Id. at 24. In discerning whether assent has
been given to an agreement, adherents of the objective test are concerned with the inten-
tions of the parties only as manifested by their actions. E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.6, at
113 (1982). The objective test, however, does more than merely inspect particular contrac-
tual language; examination of contractual intent often includes an examination of the cir-
cumstances surrounding the contract as well. See Wallace v. Rogier, 182 Ind. App. 303, 305,
395 N.E.2d 297, 300 (1979) (intention of the parties to be determined in light of surrounding
circumstances existing at time contract was made).
Objectivity in contract theory has long had support among scholars. Bronaugh, Agree-
ment, Mistake, and Objectivity in the Bargain Theory of Contract, 18 WM. & MARY L. REv.
213, 242 (1976), As Justice Holmes stated, "[t]he law has nothing to do with the actual state
of the parties' minds. In contract, as elsewhere, [we] must go by externals, and judge parties
by their conduct." 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 309 (1881). Williston, another vigorous
proponent of the objective theory, see Williston, Mutual Assent in the Formation of Con-
tracts, 14 ILL. L. REv. 85, 87 (1919), contended that the basis of a contract is the manifesta-
tion, either in words or actions, of the parties' intent, id. The primacy given to.the objective
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are disputes concerning either the creation or the terms of con-
tracts. Because this Article treats suits arising out of both oral and
written transactions, it also will deal with the parol evidence rule.
However, the primary focus of the Article is on the objective test,
and the parol evidence rule will be discussed only to the extent
that it is related to or affords insight into the objective test.
When a court is deciding whether a contract exists, or is inter-
preting the meaning of contractual provisions, it is engaged in a
task that involves the application of legal rules to factual situa-
tions. Since the factual inquiry is a crucial part of the adjudicatory
process, its importance should not be understated.2 Contracts are
meant to be consensual arrangements; therefore, before a court en-
forces a relationship as a contract, the court must have a reasona-
bly certain basis in fact to justify binding the parties to each
other.
The facts on which the court's resolution will be based are
often complex. Contracts are formed by an alignment of individual
contractual intentions through the medium of communication.
They necessarily involve a combination of an internal or subjective
element, and an external or objective element. The internal ele-
ment is the individual state of mind of each of the par-
ties-individual understanding, intent, and expectations. The ex-
ternal element is communication-the overt conduct through
which the parties signal their intent to each other.4 To reach actual
theory by Williston was reflected in the Restatement of Contracts, see RESTATEMENT OF
CONTRACTS §§ 3, 5, 20, 21 (1932), and can be seen today in the Second Restatement of
Contracts, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 3, 5, 20, 21 (1981). Section 3 reads
in part: ["An agreement is a manifestation of mutual assent on the part of two or more
persons."] Id. § 3.
The ultimate policy aim of the objective theory is to establish a minimum standard of
business certainty and security. This goal is effectuated by using the objective "reasonable
man" standard against which the parties' intentions are measured. Samek, The Objective
Theory of Contract and the Rule in L'Estrange v. Graucob, 52 CAN. B. REV. 351, 370 (1974).
' See Charbonnages De France v. Smith, 597 F.2d 406, 415 (4th Cir. 1979) (objective
manifestation of intention presents interpretive issues for trier of fact); Arrowhead Constr.
Co. v. Essex Corp., 233 Kan. 241, 248, 662 P.2d 1195, 1201 (1983) (question whether a bind-
ing contract was entered depends on intention of parties and is question of fact); Prince
Enters. v. Griffith Oil Co., 8 Kan App. 2d 644, 649, 664 P.2d 877, 882 (1983) (intention of
parties concerning whether contract exists is question of fact).
I See infra § II (discussing consensual basis of contract).
For a more comprehensive discussion of the objective and subjective elements, see
infra notes 15-19 and accompanying text; see also E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 3.6, at
113 (contrasting subjective and objective theorists); McIntosh, Legal Hermeneutics: A Phil-
osophical Critique, 35 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 36-38 (1982) (comparing objective-subjective contro-
versy to similar debates).
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agreement on every term of their relationship, each contracting
party must know not only what she intends, but also what the
other party intends. Both parties must express their intent com-
prehensively, and they each must efficiently understand the other's
communication.' It is trite to observe that few people are consist-
ently capable of such rapport. Therefore, courts routinely are re-
quired to untangle disputes that have arisen because underlying
intent has been imperfectly expressed or inadequately received, so
that the apparent agreement often does not represent the relation-
ship intended by one, or possibly both, of the parties." This Article
focuses on those disputes, and on the problems presented by the
divergence between intent and overt communication.
When subjective and objective elements are irreconcilable, the
court must decide which should be given greater weight. For many
years it has been settled that a court should apply an objective
standard in resolving formation disputes.7 This doctrine maintains
that a court should favor the overt communications of the parties
and should disregard evidence of their subjective intent to the ex-
tent that such evidence describes a state of mind inconsistent with
the overt action.8 Preference for the overt lies at the basis of the
I Cf. Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int'l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116, 117
(S.D.N.Y. 1960) (where parties disagreed as to subject matter, contract held not binding). In
Frigaliment, the contract merely stated the term "chicken" without further description. Id.
Nevertheless, the parties disagreed on the meaning of that term as used in their contract.
Id. The plaintiff defined "chicken" as a "young chicken, suitable for boiling and frying,"
while the defendant contended that "chicken" meant "any bird of that genus that meets
contract specifications on weight and quality." Id.
6 See, e.g., Lucy v. Zehmer, 196 Va. 493, 498-500, 84 S.E.2d 516, 520 (1954). In Lucy,
the Zehmers agreed to sell a farm to the Lucys for $50,000. Id. at 495, 84 S.E.2d at 518. The
Zehmers, however, claimed that their acceptance was in jest, and that the entire transaction
was merely a joke. Id. at 502, 84 S.E.2d at 521. The Lucys, on the other hand, understood
the transaction to be a serious undertaking and took appropriate steps to consummate the
deal. Id. at 496, 84 S.E.2d at 518. The court, adhering to the objective test, held that the
promise was binding and that a contract was formed. Id. at 503, 84 S.E.2d at 522. The court
stated that: "The mental assent of the parties is not requisite for the formation of a con-
tract. If the words or other acts of one of the parties have but one reasonable meaning, his
undisclosed intention is immaterial." Id. at 503, 84 S.E.2d at 522.
7 See J. CALAMAR! & J. PERMLO, supra note 1, at 23 (objective theory of contracts has
been dominant for at least a century); E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 3.6, at 114 (objective
theory became ascendant by end of 19th century). But cf. Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R.R.,
153 F.2d 757, 761 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank, J., concurring) (objectivist theory went too far in
treating all kinds of agreements alike and in excluding consideration of actual intent of
parties).
' See Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. v. Chicago Title & Trust, 714 F.2d 48, 50 (7th Cir.
1983) (intent refers to party's outward manifestation of his intention rather than to some
unexpressed intention); Fairway Center Corp. v. U.I.P. Corp., 502 F.2d 1135, 1140 (8th Cir.
1984]
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objective test.9 When the apparent agreement is recorded in writ-
ing, the concentration on outward communication is even more
heavily emphasized by the parol evidence rule. 10
The objective test is firmly established in case law, and it is
routinely applied by courts." Probing such an apparently well-set-
tled and frequently traversed area might seem at first to be a banal
exercise. However, a study of contemporary case law reveals that
the rules of the objective test are unclear and that its purpose and
scope are surprisingly lacking in definition. 12 The objective test is
often applied ineptly in formation adjudication, and is often used
thoughtlessly and rigidly to exclude evidence that might be viable
and relevant." While this Article recognizes the value of using ob-
1974) (what is expressed by parties constitutes contract that courts are to enforce); J.
Baranello & Sons v. Hausmann Indus., 571 F. Supp. 333, 339 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (quoting
Reprosystem, B.V. v. SCM Corp., 522 F. Supp. 1257, 1275 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), modified on
appeal, 727 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1984)) ("What is looked to in determining whether an agree-
ment has been reached is not the ... parties' subjective intent but their objective intent as
manifested by their expressed words"); see also supra note 1.
9 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2 comment b; id. §§ 3, 17, 18 (1981). The
Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides that "[m]any contract disputes arise because
different people attach different meanings to the same words and conduct. The phrase
'manifestation of intention' adopts an external or objective standard for interpreting con-
duct; it means the external expression of intention as distinguished from undisclosed inten-
tion." Id. § 2 comment b.
1o See infra note 80. Since the parol evidence rule is based on the rationale that a later
written agreement has been substituted for prior negotiations, the rule is not relevant unless
an enforceable written agreement has first been established. See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note
1, § 7.4, at 461.
"1 See, e.g., Horwitz v. Sprague, 440 F. Supp. 1346, 1350 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) ("few axioms
are more venerable than that the manifest, rather than the personal, intent of a party con-
trols in the formation of a contract"); Norse Petroleum A/S v. LVO Int'l, Inc., 389 A.2d 771,
775 (Del. Super. Ct. 1978) (a party's objective intent determines the existence of a contract);
Hill v. Okay Constr. Co., 312 Minn. 324, 332, 252 N.W.2d 107, 114 (1977) ("test of contrac-
tual formation is an objective one").
11 See infra notes 128-137 and accompanying text.
13 See, e.g., Action Eng'g v. Martin Marietta Aluminum, 670 F.2d 456 (3d Cir. 1982).
The court in Action Engineering ruled that a clause in a construction contract, which stated
that if the defendant was of the opinion that the plaintiff was behind schedule, the defen-
dant could terminate the contract, should be interpreted to allow the defendant to termi-
nate the contract. See id. at 461. The court refused to take into consideration evidence
tending to show that the plaintiff had completed almost 90% of the job and that the parties
intended that a substantial completion would satisfy the parties' criteria. See id. at 458; see
also Norse Petroleum A/S v. LVO Int'l, Inc., 389 A.2d 771 (Del. Super. Ct. 1978). In Norse,
the court refused even to consider the minutes of a board meeting that pertained to the
formation of a contract. See 389 A.2d at 775. The court stated that "[t]he minutes could do
no more than indicate the subjective intent of [the defendant] with regard to the proposed
contract. It is a settled rule of contract law that a party's objective intent. . . determine[s]
the existence of a contract, not its subjective intent." Id. [T]he minutes [,therefore,] could
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jective standards in resolving formation disputes, it stresses that
courts should recognize the purpose of, and limitations upon, the
employment of those standards.
The argument will be made that the objective test is not a rule
of substantive law, and that it should not be applied as such. The
objective test is a standard for evaluation, a guide for determining
the weight to be given to evidence. It suggests a procedure to be
followed by courts in resolving formation litigation in a way that is
consistent with the substantive rules and fundamental policies of
contract law. The objective test is neither self-contained nor self-
justifying. It is a vehicle for effectuating policy, and is viable only
to the extent that it serves policy by directing the court toward a
principled decision. 14
It is the goal of this Article to define the scope and purpose of
the objective test in light of the policies it should serve, and to
suggest a means of applying objective standards in formation adju-
dication in a way that effectuates those policies. The discussion be-
gins in section II by identifying the concerns that must be ad-
dressed in formulating rules for resolving formation disputes.
Section III addresses the policies that must be served in the resolu-
tion of formation disputes. Sections IV and V discuss and criticize
the judicial approaches to objectivity as they have developed and
as they exist in contemporary case law, and sections VI and VII
propose a means of applying objective standards in a way that con-
forms with contract policy.
II. THE FORMULATION OF RULES FOR RESOLVING FORMATION
DISPUTES: LEGAL POLICY, SUBSTANTIVE LAW, AND PROCEDURAL
RULES
The following hypothetical fact pattern will be used to illus-
trate the context of formation disputes and to identify the distinc-
tions among policy considerations, substantive legal rules, and
rules of procedure:
A needed money to pay her debts. She asked B, her wealthy
uncle, to lend her $1,000 for two months, promising to repay the
not be of crucial importance." Id.; see also Powel v. Burke, 178 Conn. 384, 387, 423 A.2d 97,
99 (1979). In Powel, the Supreme Court of Connecticut ignored the defendant's contention
that the formula in the contract for calculating profits resulted in mere "paper profits," even
though the intent of the parties allegedly was that the plaintiff would receive payments only
upon the accrual of actual profits. See 178 Conn. at 387, 423 A.2d at 99.
'1 See infra notes 175-180 and accompanying text.
1984]
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loan with interest at the current rate within 60 days. B nodded his
head vigorously in apparent assent. A and B then parted without
further discussion.
An observer of this transaction would probably infer, on the
basis of the verbal expression of A and the physical conduct of B,
that a loan agreement had been concluded. However, the observer
would not be able to tell what A and B were thinking while they
were manifesting these overt indications of agreement. Assume the
following alternative, uncommunicated states of mind:
Case 1: B's vigorous nod in response to A's request did not result
from his intention to communicate assent. It was an involuntary
and unconscious reflex action caused by his intense irritation at
being asked for a loan by yet another of his sponging relatives.
Case 2: A knew that B had assisted other family members in the
past by giving them cash gifts. A was too proud to ask for a gift,
although that is what she intended the transaction to be. She
asked B for the loan on the uncommunicated expectation that B
would treat her as generously as he had treated her relatives. She
assumed that B would not call on her to repay the debt. B, how-
ever, who never liked A as much as he liked the rest of her family,
fully expected to be repaid.
Case 3: A's expectations were as described in Case 2. In this case,
however, she had correctly assessed B's benevolence. He did not
intend to accept repayment from A. Thus, while neither party
communicated the intent that the money would be a gift, they
share by coincidence a common intent at the time of transacting.
Case 4: Both A and B intended the transaction to be a loan on
the terms expressed. However, A intended the term "current
rate" to mean the market rate prevailing when the agreement was
concluded. B understood the term to mean that the interest rate
would vary over the 60-day period in conformity with the market
rate.
In the first case the formation dispute will involve the ques-
tion of whether the parties entered into a contract at all. This may
be an issue in all four cases, but the facts in cases two through four
seem more strongly to present disputes over the terms of the con-
tract. 15 Each of the four hypothetical cases illustrates a conflict
between apparent agreement and subjective intent. In each case,
the outward manifestation is the same, and in any ensuing litiga-
" For the sake of simplicity, the reader is asked to ignore any issues that might arise
out of the consideration doctrine or the statute of frauds.
[Vol. 59:1
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tion would be proved by objective evidence.
Objective evidence is evidence of observed or expressed behav-
ior.16 It includes not only evidence of a party's own utterances or
actions (for example, A's evidence describing what she said to B),
but also testimony describing the utterances or acts of the other
party (for example, A's evidence describing B's act of nodding after
A had spoken). Objective evidence normally relates to the external
element of the transaction-communication. However, it also may
relate to the subjective intent of one of the parties if that intent
was translated into overt conduct not communicated to the other
party. For example, if in Case 2 A had told her brother C immedi-
ately before the transaction with B that she intended to procure a
gift, but would do so by asking B for a loan, C's testimony on what
A had said would be objective evidence relating to A's subjective
intent. 7
11 In the contractual setting, objective evidence includes all evidence of observed utter-
ances (whether written or oral), actions, or other external signs that signify that consent was
intended. See A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 542 (1963). Courts often admit objective
evidence to aid in contract interpretation. See, e.g., Haeberle v. Texas Int'l Airlines, 738
F.2d 1434, 1439 (5th Cir. 1984) (clarity or ambiguity should be assessed from manifest cir-
cumstances surrounding contract); Caporale v. Mar Les, Inc., 656 F.2d 242, 244 (7th Cir.
1981) (objective manifestation is controlling); Fairway Center Corp. v. U.I.P. Corp., 502 F.2d
1135, 1140-41 (8th Cir. 1974) (express terms, rather than subjective mental processes, con-
stitute a contract).
In Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Business Credit, 619 F.2d 1001 (3d Cir. 1980), the court
used the term objective evidence to refer to a demonstration of circumstances surrounding
the formation of the contract that might be indicative of a specialized usage agreed to by
the parties, as distinct from a common usage, see id. at 1012 n.12.
1 See Wallace v. Rogier, 182 Ind. App. 303, 307, 395 N.E. 297, 301 (1979). In Wallace,
the parties entered into a sham transaction concocted to enable one of the parties to obtain
financing. Id. at 305, 395 N.E.2d at 299. The actual intent of the parties was that they would
not be bound despite the apparent import of their actions. Id. at 306, 395 N.E.2d at 300-01.
Believing it was precluded by the objective test from admitting evidence by the parties of
their secret intent, the court nevertheless was willing to receive the evidence of their attor-
ney based on express statements by the parties that the transaction would be for the sake of
form only. Id. at 305-06, 395 N.E.2d at 300.
Objective evidence relating to subjective intent often is offered in the context of proving
fraud, where one party to a contract claims the other entered into the agreement with no
intention of carrying it out. See, e.g., Williams v. Hasshagen, 166 Cal. 386, 392, 137 P. 9, 12
(1913). In Williams, objective evidence of a bank officer's acts and statements were suffi-
cient to prove an intent to defraud. Id. at 392, 137 P. at 12. The court reasoned that "[tihe
effort of the corporation to collect the note instead of returning it according to the promise
of Hays [the bank officer] is sufficient evidence of that fraud which arose from the making
of a promise without intention of performance." Id.; see also Sallies v. Johnson, 85 Conn. 77,
79-80, 81 A. 974, 975 (1911) (party's intention in doing an act is fact admissible in any
action, to be proved by actor's words or inferred from conduct); Foster v. Dwire, 51 N.D.
581, 594, 199 N.W. 1017, 1021-22 (1924) (testimony regarding plaintiff's promises, represen-
1984]
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If objective evidence includes all evidence of observed behav-
ior, then its nemesis, subjective evidence, includes only the direct
testimony of a party on her actual state of mind.18 Subjective evi-
dence may relate to a party's intent accompanying or motivating
her conduct or utterance (for example, in Case 2, A's evidence that
she believed that the transaction was a gift, or in Case 4, A's or B's
testimony on their own understanding of the term "current rate"),
or to a party's interpretation or understanding of the other party's
conduct or utterance (for example, in Case 1, A's evidence that she
understood B's nod to signify assent). Therefore, one must distin-
guish the subjective and objective elements of a transaction from
the subjective and objective evidence offered to prove those ele-
ments. The rules that prescribe the extent to which intent and
communication must coexist in a transaction for it to be enforcea-
ble as a contract are rules of substantive law,19 which determine
the nature of contracts. By contrast, the rules that determine the
admissibility, evaluation, and interpretation of subjective and ob-
jective evidence are procedural rules. The purpose of these rules is
to ensure that evidence offered in the formation dispute is
presented and dealt with in a way that enables the court to decide
most efficiently and accurately whether the necessary elements of
tations, and subsequent conduct properly submitted to jury on issue of fraudulent intent).
18 See 1 W. JAEGER, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 21 (3d ed. 1957). For a definition of
"subjective evidence," see J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1715, at 60 (3d ed. 1940). Wigmore ob-
served that "[t]he conditions of a person's mind may be indicated by his conduct or by his
assertions. The former evidence is of an indirect or circumstantial nature . . . . The latter
evidence is of a direct or testimonial nature . . . ." Id. (emphasis in original).
19 See 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 16, § 537, at 41, § 536, at 33. In his treatise on contracts,
Corbin outlined 18 "tentative working rules of substantive law," including the following:
1. The primary and ultimate purpose of interpretation is to determine and make
effective the intention of the contracting parties.
4. No party to a contract should ever be bound by an interpretation that is deter-
mined exclusively by the linguistic education and experience of the judge.
7. No word or group of words in any language has an "objective" meaning separate
from and independent of its actual use by some person to convey his thought to
another person.
Id. § 572B, at 198-99 (Supp. 1964) (emphasis in original). For examples of judicial applica-
tions of Corbin's rules, see Stark v. Budwarker, Inc., 25 Mich. App. 305, 313-314 n.9, 181
N.W.2d 298, 301-02 n.9 (1970) (cardinal purpose of construction is to determine and give
effect to intention of parties); Detroit Edison Co. v. Zoner, 12 Mich. App. 612, 624, 163
N.W.2d 496, 502-03 (1968) (Levin, J., dissenting) (ultimate purpose of contract interpreta-
tion is to determine and enforce contract as parties intended it).
[Vol. 59:1
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contract were present in the transaction.20
Although they are not always treated as such, the objective
standards roughly described by the term "objective test" should in
fact be characterized as procedural rules. Because they are proce-
dural in nature, they are not self-justifying. Consequently, any at-
tempt to define the scope and purpose of these standards must be-
gin with an examination of their relationship to the rules of
substantive law and underlying legal policy. Legal policy, the foun-
dation on which rules of substantive law are built, differs from le-
gal rules in that policy is much broader and more profoundly em-
bedded in the premises of the legal system. Legal policy reflects
the underlying ideological principles that justify the more specific
rules of law, and channels them in the direction of the political,
social, and economic goals of the community. Therefore, before le-
gal rules can be settled, courts must identify and articulate the
policies that those rules must effect. Once these substantive rules
have been determined, courts can concentrate on devising proce-
dural rules. That order is crucial. If, through a slavish concentra-
tion on procedural rules fixed by precedent, courts forget that they
are in fact ancillary rules, the rules may fail in their purpose and
may preclude courts from recognizing and accommodating under-
lying policy.
For the purpose of illustrating the relationship between policy,
substantive law, and procedural rules in the context of contract
formation, a simplified model of policy and rule development is
used in this section. Since the model is a caricature, exaggerated
for the sake of illustration, more accurate and refined discussion of
the policies and rules underlying formation dispute resolution is
attempted in following sections.
Assume for the sake of argument that in the late nineteenth
century influential courts identified as the dominant policy behind
the enforcement of contracts the facilitating of economic ex-
changes. The courts believed that such transactions could be facili-
tated only if people could unquestioningly and absolutely rely on
the manifested contractual conduct of others. To achieve that gen-
eral sense of reliance, courts held that the resolution of formation
disputes must be rigidly and consistently confined to an investiga-
20 The term procedure is defined as "[t]he mode of proceeding by which a legal right is
enforced, as distinguished from the substantive law which gives or defines the right."
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1083 (5th ed. 1979).
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tion of the conduct of parties, without any credence being given to
the actual intentions that motivated their conduct. This policy
generated rules of substantive law that defined contract only in
terms of an objective element: Contracts are formed by manifesta-
tions of assent, not by assent itself. 21 This rule of substantive law
in turn justified evidentiary rules that, in order to direct the
factfinder away from facts that had become legally irrelevant, ei-
ther excluded subjective evidence or created presumptions in favor
of objective evidence.22
Strict application of the foregoing policy, and the rules gener-
ated by it, would lead a court dealing with illustrative Case 1 to
bind B even though he did not intend his nod to express assent.
Because, under the rules assumed above, intent was not required
for contract formation, B's intent would be irrelevant as a matter
of law.23 Similarly, in Case 2, A would be held to the loan transac-
21 See, e.g., Hotchkiss v. National City Bank, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff'd, 201
F. 664 (2d Cir. 1912), aff'd, 231 U.S. 50 (1914) ("A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to
do with the personal, or individual, intent of the parties"). The general rule giving primacy
to manifestations of assent has been. repeated both by courts, see, e.g., Capital Warehouse
Co. v. McGill-Warner-Farnham Co., 276 Minn. 108, 114, 149 N.W.2d 31, 35 (1967) ("It is the
objective thing, the manifestation of mutual assent, which is essential to the making of a
contract"), and in scholarly works, see, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 20 (1932) (mani-
festation of mutual assent by parties to informal contract is essential to formation).
22 See 13 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, § 1536, at 34 (3d ed. 1970). In the case of a conclu-
sive or irrebuttable presumption, when fact B is proved, fact A must be taken as true, and
the adversary is not allowed to disprove it. C. McCORMICK, HANDaOOK OF THE LAW OF EVI-
DENCE § 342, at 966 (3d ed. 1984). In contract law, a conclusive presumption allows mental
assent to be presumed on the basis of the parties' external acts. 13 S. WILLISTON, supra, §
1536, at 34; see, e.g., Sokoloff v. National City Bank, 239 N.Y. 158, 170, 145 N.E. 917, 920
(1924). In Sokoloff, Judge Cardozo quoted Justice Holmes in asserting that "[a]ssent in the
sense of the law is a matter of overt acts, not of inward unanimity in motives, design or the
interpretation of words." Id. (quoting O'Donnell v. Town of Clinton, 145 Mass. 461, 463, 14
N.E. 747, 751 (1888) (Holmes, J.)).
A cohclusive presumption is usually characterized as a rule of substantive law rather
than a rule of evidence. See C. McCORMICK, supra, § 342, at 966; 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2491, at 307 (Chadbourn rev. 1981). Since a manifestation of
assent gives rise to a conclusive presumption of assent, actual assent is fictionalized and,
thus, effectively removed as a requirement of substantive law.
23 See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 3.6, at 113-14. While the parties to most con-
tracts give actual as well as apparent assent, it is clear that a mental reservation on the part
of one party does not impair the obligation he purports to undertake. RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 comment c (1979). Courts have followed the commentators in de-
claring intent irrelevant to the formation of contracts. See, e.g., Triboro Coach Corp. v. New
York State Labor Relations Bd., 261 App. Div. 636, 638, 27 N.Y.S.2d 83, 85 (2d Dep't 1941)
("[m]ere intent means nothing"); see Embry v. Hargadine, McKittrick Dry Goods Co., 127
Mo. App. 383, 388, 105 S.W. 777, 778 (1907) (intent of parties can neither make contract,
nor prevent one, if words used were sufficient to constitute contract).
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tion despite her intent to contract for a gift. The same result would
be reached in Case 3, because the shared intent was unexpressed.
In Case 4, concentrating only on the external indications of agree-
ment, the court would have to resolve the dispute over the mean-
ing of the term "current rate" without recourse to evidence of the
parties' understanding of its meaning. 4
This strictly objective resolution of the cases would be justifia-
ble as long as the link between procedural rules, substantive law,
and underlying policy remained unbroken. However, policy
changes as courts perceive changing conditions and shifts in socie-
tal goals. The rigid facilitation philosophy, therefore, may fade in
the light of a realization that the true goal of contract enforcement
is the protection of individual contractual autonomy, and that an
exclusive focus on the protection of economic exchanges is not the
best way to advance that goal. The emphasis on overt conduct
must then be tempered by at least some inquiry into whether the
outward conduct was based on an exercise of individual
autonomy. 5
This change in policy will necessitate a new definition of con-
tract to accommodate both the objective element, conduct, and the
subjective element, assent. Substantive law will have to provide a
means of assigning weight to those elements where they are in con-
flict, and procedural rules governing the reception of evidence
must also change because subjective evidence, once legally irrele-
vant, will have become useful.
Of course, the common law does not develop tidily. Some
courts will have been receptive to changing societal values and
changing conditions, and they will have identified and expressed
the new policy while refining the substantive law and evidentiary
rules. These courts will therefore be able to perceive, for example,
that the issue to be established by subjective evidence in Case 1 is
24 The resolution of these fact patterns is obviously oversimplified for illustration, and
it is not suggested that courts ever applied the objective theory in such an absolute form. A
more qualified discussion of the impact of the objective theory on the resolution of disputes
is contained in § IV of this Article. See infra notes 51-121 and accompanying text.
22 A party may avoid liability by showing that he never intended to engage in the ac-
tions by which he appeared to manifest assent. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 3.6, at 114.
Moreover when each party to what otherwise would be a bargain manifests an intention that
the transaction is not to be taken seriously, there is no manifestation of assent. RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 18 comment c (1979).
The issue of individual autonomy and the balancing of assent and expectations is dis-
cussed further in § II.
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not the same as that in Case 2. In Cases 3 and 4, they will be able
to enforce a contract that more closely resembles what the parties
intended.
Other courts will change more slowly. They may have failed to
perceive the need for change in policy, or they may not have
thought about policy carefully enough, and consequently will con-
tinue to apply rules established by precedent without inquiry into
the purpose and effect of such standards. Some of these courts
may have moved partially in the direction of recognizing the new
policy, and may have hovered between following and disregarding
outmoded rules. Courts that have not come to terms with the pol-
icy issues will approach formation disputes in an unprincipled way
that will likely confuse and frustrate the goals of formation adjudi-
cation.26 It is that confusion and lack of coherent principle that is
addressed in this Article.
The preceding section sketched the nature of formation dis-
putes, and the relationship among poliey, substantive law, and pro-
cedural rules in the resolution of those disputes. The following sec-
tion identifies the policy issues more carefully.
III. ASSENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY-THE FUNDAMENTAL POLICIES
GOVERNING CONTRACT FORMATION
When a court resolves a formation dispute, it decides whether
an alleged relationship qualifies for enforcement as a contract.27
The court's decision to enforce the relationship arises from two
fundamental policies, which this Article identifies as the "assent
policy" and the "accountability policy.128
26 See, e.g., Seitzinger's Inc. v. National Bank, 490 F. Supp. 340, 342-43 (D.D.C. 1980)
(evidence of intent considered then disregarded because of objective theory); Carsello v.
Touchton, 231 Ga. 878, 880, 204 S.E.2d 589, 591-92 (1974) (parties' intent will be enforced if
sufficient words are used to express it).
For a concise critique of the objective approach and problems it has caused in the
courts, see generally Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R.R., 153 F.2d 757, 760-70 (2d Cir. 1946)
(Frank, J., concurring); Note, Contracts- Objective Approach-Subjective Approach, 23
N.Y.U. L. REv. 143 (1948).
27 See, e.g., Caporale v. Mar Les, Inc., 656 F.2d 242, 244 (7th Cir. 1981) (fact that par-
ties signed agreement does not resolve issue of whether valid, enforceable contract arose);
Interstate Indus. v. Barclay Indus., 540 F.2d 868, 870 (7th Cir. 1976) (deciding whether cor-
respondence between parties constituted enforceable contract); Industrial Prods. Mfg. Co. v.
Jewett Lumber Co., 185 F.2d 866, 869 (8th Cir. 1950) (controlling issue is whether there
existed a contract between the parties).
28 The accountability policy is closely tied to the concept of reliance. See infra notes
42-49 and 153-161 and accompanying text.
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The assent policy emerges from the inviolate principle, basic
to the common law of contracts, and explicitly recognized in the
United States Constitution," that individuals are at liberty to or-
der their commercial relationships by private agreement.30 Because
contracts arise from an exercise of private autonomy by both par-
ties, courts may enforce as contracts only those relationships that
are voluntary and consensual. The distinguishing feature of con-
tracts is mutual assent, which results from an interaction between
the parties through which they form a common contractual intent
from their individual contractual intentions."'
When a court is charged with the task of resolving a formation
dispute, it is obliged to ascertain and give effect to the common
contractual intent of the parties.2 This does not mean that courts
29 See U.S. CONsT. amends. V and XIV, § 1. The Due Process clauses of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments prohibit federal and state governments from denying persons "life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." Id. The constitutional guarantee of due
process protects an individual's right to enter and form contracts and to dissolve relation-
ships not voluntarily entered. Blum & Wellman, Participation, Assent and Liberty in Con-
tract Formation, 1982 ARIz. ST. L.J. 901, 908. In addition to the Due Process Clause, which
protects the liberty aspect of contract formation, the Contract Clause of the Constitution
prohibits states from imposing any law "impairing the Obligation of Contracts." U.S. CONST.
art. 1, § 10, cl. 1; see also 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 16, § 551 (state court's interpretation of
Contract Clause). The Contract Clause provides the right to judicial enforcement of the
interests and expectations of parties to a contract. Blum & Wellman, supra, at 908.
" See Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REv. 799, 806 (1941). Fuller notes
that the principle of private autonomy is "pervasive and indispensable" to contract law. Id.
Private autonomy means that an individual may effect a change in his legal relationships
with others. Id.
S See Bronaugh, supra note 1, at 219. Mutual assent is the culmination of a negotia-
tion process between parties who exchange compromises until they reach agreement. Id. at
217-19. In contract law, intent to enter into an agreement must be distinguished from the
underlying mental state that motivates that intent. "Intent" in a contractual sense must be
confined to mean the party's conception of the terms and nature of the relationship rather
than his or her underlying motivation in entering into the contract, or his or her anticipa-
tion of its benefits. 1 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 21 (1957); see also infra note 37 (distinc-
tion between a party's motivation for entering into a contract and his intent with regard to
the terms).
32 See, e.g., Central Jersey Dodge Truck Center, Inc. v. Sightseer Corp., 608 F.2d 1106,
1109 (6th Cir. 1979); Ancraft Prods. Co. v. Universal Oil Prods. Co., 100 Ill. App. 3d 694,
697, 427 N.E.2d 585, 587 (1981); Onderdonk v. Presbyterian Homes, 85 N.J. 171, 183, 425
A.2d 1057, 1063 (1981).
If a court imposes a contract in the absence of an adequate level of assent, it exceeds its
legitimate function and infringes on the contract liberty of the party on whom the contract
has been imposed. See Blum & Wellman, supra note 29, at 931-38. Indeed, courts have
recognized that they are "compelled to carry out the parties' intentions." E.g., Pennzoil v.
Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 645 F.2d 360, 388 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1142 (1982); Ader v. Hughes, 570 F.2d 303, 309 (10th Cir. 1978); Leonard Concrete Pipe
Co. v. C.W. Blakeslee & Sons, Inc., 178 Conn. 594, 597, 424 A.2d 277, 279 (1979).
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may not enforce as contracts those relationships that exhibit less-
than-perfect actual agreement. The assent policy does not mandate
complete agreement on every facet of the arrangement.33 Principles
of contract liberty require that a distinction be drawn between le-
gal assent and actual assent so that courts are able to enforce seri-
ously intended relationships that have created legitimate expecta-
tions of enforceability.3 4
The requirement of mutual assent must therefore be brought
into proper perspective by acknowledging that the law seeks not
perfect, but adequate, coincidence of minds.3 5 Courts should recog-
nize that the formulation of an agreement requires the externaliza-
tion of individual will. Agreement occurs through a process of
human interaction that is rarely thorough enough to produce a
wholly accurate synthesis of individual intentions.3 6 Often there
will be gaps in the agreement because one or both of the parties
3 See Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Business Credit, 619 F.2d 1001, 1009 (3d Cir. 1980);
Lambert Corp. v. Evans, 575 F.2d 132, 137 (6th Cir. 1978); Chase Manhattan Bank v. First
Marion Bank, 437 F.2d 1040, 1049 (5th Cir. 1971) (quoting Eskimo Pie Corp. v. Whitelawn
Dairies, Inc., 284 F. Supp. 987, 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)). The law should, insofar as possible,
foster security of transactions by providing certain and predictable rules that facilitate eco-
nomic interaction and promote confidence in the enforceability of seriously-intended con-
tractual relationships. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-204(3) & official comment (1978) (even though
terms in contract are left open, if parties have intended to contract and there is "reasonably
certain basis" for relief, contract will not fail).
" See supra notes 29-30, 32-33 and accompanying text.
31 See Lambert Corp. v. Evans, 575 F.2d 132, 137 (7th Cir. 1978). In Lambert, the ap-
pellants argued that the parties had never agreed to many of the matters concerning the
transactions in question. Id. The court responded that "there is nothing in the law of con-
tracts that requires parties' minds to meet on all conceivably related questions." Id. The
Lambert court affirmed the lower court's decision that an enforceable contract existed be-
cause the appellants had not shown that any essential terms were not agreed upon. Id.; see
also Care Display, Inc. v. Didde-Glaser, Inc., 225 Kan. 232, 238, 589 P.2d 599, 604 (1979)
(mutual assent required only with respect to essential terms of a contract); Minneapolis
Cablesystems v. City of Minneapolis, 299 N.W.2d 121, 122 (Minn. 1980) (parties must agree
to essential terms to form a contract). The Uniform Commercial Code acknowledges that a
contract may be formed when the parties have not come to an agreement on all the terms.
See U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (1978) & official comment.
38 See Bronaugh, supra note 1, at 219. Professor Bronaugh draws the distinction be-
tween parties being in agreement and parties having an agreement: To be in agreement,
they must think the same way; to have an agreement, they must communicate those
thoughts to each other. Id. Even when parties are in agreement with each other, the extent
of the agreement may range anywhere from a detailed agreement on the precise terms of the
contract to only a shallow agreement on the broad scope and nature of the transaction. Id.
at 214-19; see also Farnsworth, Disputes Over Omission in Contracts, 68 COLUM. L. REV.
860, 868-73 (1968) (discussing how ambiguities and uncertainties may be embodied in a
contract); infra note 37 (methods by which courts deal with ambiguity and vagueness in
contracts).
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will not have formed clear intentions on every point. Moreover,
even if a party is able to crystallize his or her thoughts on every
pertinent point, such individual intentions may not emerge clearly
from the overt communications between the parties. The verbal or
behavioral symbols used to express intent may be poorly chosen
(as in Case 4 above, where the parties chose an apparently ambigu-
ous phrase to describe the rate of interest), a party may be deliber-
ately evasive (as is illustrated by the terms of A's offer in Cases 2
and 3 above), or the parties may otherwise fail in their purpose of
conveying underlying intention. 7
These practical barriers to comprehensive agreement temper
the assent requirement. In searching for assent, therefore, courts
do not look for a literal "meeting of the minds. ' 38 Rather, they
conduct an examination of the relationship to determine whether
37 See 1 A. CORBIN, supra note 16, § 107. When the manifestations used by the parties
to express their intent are susceptible of more than one interpretation, the contract is
deemed ambiguous. Castaneda v. Dura-Vent Corp., 648 F.2d 612, 619 (9th Cir. 1981); Uni-
versal Towing Co. v. United Barge Co., 579 F.2d 1098, 1101 (8th Cir. 1978); First Nat'l Bank
v. Clark, 226 Kan. 619, 705, 602 P.2d 1299, 1304 (1979) (quoting Wood v. Hatcher, 199 Kan.
238, 242, 428 P.2d 799, 803 (1967)). When a contract is deemed ambiguous and neither party
has reason to know of the meaning attached by the other, a court may find that no contract
exists. See Flower City Painting Contractors, Inc. v. Gumina Constr. Co., 591 F.2d 162, 165-
66 (2d Cir. 1979); Julius Kayser & Co. v. Textron, Inc., 228 F.2d 783, 789-90 (4th Cir. 1956);
Oswald v. Allen, 285 F. Supp. 488, 492 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 417 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1969); see
also 1 S. WILLISTON, supra note 31, § 95, at 345-46. Alternatively, a court may decide to
interpret the ambiguity based on the custom and usage prevailing in the area. See, e.g.,
Corbin-Dykes Elec. Co. v. Burr, 18 Ariz. App. 101, 104, 500 P.2d 632, 634 (1972) (evidence of
custom and usage admissible only where agreement ambiguous); see also infra note 40 (dis-
cussing types of evidence used to determine what parties intended in event of ambiguity or
conflict over interpretation).
'8 The subjectivist maxim, "meeting of the minds," is frequently used by both older
and contemporary courts, but usually its meaning is metaphorical rather than literal. See,
e.g., Rice v. McKinley, 590 S.W.2d 305, 307 (Ark. Ct. App. 1979) ("meeting of the minds"
refers to mutual assent or mutual obligation); Brant v. Gallup, 5 Ill. App. 262, 267 (1879);
see also 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 16, § 537, at 42 ("meeting of the minds" does not necessa-
rily mean that the parties give to the words of the contract and identical meaning).
Usually, "the manifestation of a party's intention rather than his actual subjective in-
tent is. . .controlling." Chase Manhattan Bank v. First Marion Bank, 437 F.2d 1040, 1049
(5th Cir. 1971); see Mid-Continent Tel. Corp. v. Home Tel. Co., 319 F. Supp. 1176, 1191
(N.D. Miss. 1970); Howarth v. First Nat'l Bank, 596 P.2d 1164, 1167 n.8 (Alaska 1979). The
subjective intent of the parties does not ordinarily convince the courts of either contract
formation or lack of it unless the subject matter of the contract is defined in ambiguous
terms or there are no objective manifestations of intent. Caporale v. Mar Les, Inc., 656 F.2d
242, 244 (7th Cir. 1981); L. SIMPSON, CONTRACTS § 9, at 10 (2d ed. 1965); see Swanson v.
Holmquist, 13 Wash. App. 939, 942, 539 P.2d 104, 106 (1975). Williston, however, has sug-
gested that ignoring the subjective intent of the parties could result in the formation of a
contract that does not conform to the intent of either party. 1 S. WILLISTON, supra note 31,
§ 95, at 349.
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it is substantially consensual-whether there has been a suffi-
ciently close mesh of individual intentions to create agreement on
the relationship as a whole or on the disputed term. 9 This, how-
ever, does not mean that courts may ignore the requirement of as-
sent. The determination of whether a contract was formed is still
premised on actual, albeit sometimes imperfect, assent.
In order to comply with the assent policy, the inquiry into the
transaction must be based upon an evaluation of the facts of the
parties' interaction. The factual inquiry must begin with the pre-
mise that all evidence is worthy of consideration. It must extend to
all pertinent facts, including not only the overt conduct of the par-
ties, but also their states of mind-that is, their intentions in act-
ing on or in responding to overt conduct.40 An inquiry based on a
rule that requires the court deliberately to overlook any of those
facts prevents the court from conducting an adequate inquiry into
the fact of assent, and will endanger the assent policy by allowing
the court to impose on one or both parties an arrangement that
does not exhibit an adequate degree of assent.
The assent policy, however, is not the only policy that bears
upon the court's inquiry. The accountability principle expands the
'9 See, e.g., Rice v. McKinley, 590 S.W.2d 305, 307 (Ark. Ct. App. 1979) (letter in ques-
tion held to express agreement and to recite mutual exchange of obligations sufficient to
meet essentials of a contract).
'0 Some courts have acknowledged that evidence concerning the states of mind of the
parties should be considered even when the contract has no apparent ambiguities. See, e.g.,
Pennzoil Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 645 F.2d 360, 388 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1142 (1982); Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison v. Telex Corp., 602 F.2d 866, 873
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 981 (1979). Both the Uniform Commercial Code and the
Restatement (Second) of Cofitracts advocate this approach. See U.C.C. § 1-205, official com-
ment 1 (1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201 (1982). State of mind evidence is
admitted because courts acknowledge that the language of a contract may not have an abso-
lute and precise meaning. See Lucie v. Kleen-Leen, Inc., 499 F.2d 220, 221 (7th Cir. 1974),
overruled, Sunstream Jet Express, Inc. v. International Air Serv. Co., 734 F.2d 1258 (7th
Cir. 1984); Farnsworth, supra note 36, at 876-81. An alternate rationale for the admission of
extrinsic evidence concerning the parties' states of mind is that "courts are compelled to
give effect to the parties' intentions." Pennzoil, 645 F.2d at 388; see Western Sec. Co. v.
National Reserve Life Ins., 570 F.2d 269, 271 (8th Cir. 1978); Manuel Lujan Ins., Inc. v.
Jordan, 100 N.M. 573, 575, 673 P.2d 1306, 1308 (1983). Courts that admit evidence to deter-
mine the parties' states of mind, however, typically require inherently reliable extrinsic evi-
dence. See, e.g., Pennzoil, 645 F.2d at 388 (evidence of commercial setting and changed
circumstances held admissible); Interform Co. v. Mitchell, 575 F.2d 1270, 1277-78 (9th Cir.
1978) (evidence concerning circumstances surrounding execution of contract and subsequent
conduct of parties deemed admissible); Manuel Lujan, 100 N.M. at 576, 673 P.2d at 1309
(intent determined from parties' conduct, language, and objectives, as well as from sur-
rounding circumstances); see also 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 16, § 538, at 66-73.
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range of the definition of contract by including under its aegis
some transactions that are apparently consensual, rather than ac-
tually consensual. That is, there are some cases in which the court
will be justified in imposing an arrangement or term on a party
even in the absence of an adequate degree of assent. This will re-
sult when the facts of the case call for the party to be held ac-
countable for conduct even if the conduct does not reflect his or
her actual underlying intentions.4
Accountability is based on the policy that precludes individu-
als who, by their actions, have led others justifiably to believe that
they harbor a particular contractual intent, from later denying the
misleading import of their actions. 42 The policy goal is the protec-
tion of reasonable expectations resulting from justifiable reliance.43
Accountability is analogous to estoppel. The individual is bound
not because she has been proved to have actually assented to a
relationship or term, but because she has ostensibly assented.44
Her conduct caused the other party to the transaction justifiably to
41 See infra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
42 The principle of equitable estoppel was acknowledged by the Supreme Court in the
19th century. See Dickerson v. Colgrove, 100 U.S. 578 (1879). "The vital principle is that he
who by his language or conduct leads another to do what he would not otherwise have done,
shall not subject such person to loss or injury by disappointing the expectations upon which
he acted." Id. at 580.
43 Kabil Devs. Corp. v. Mignot, 279 Or. 151, 155, 566 P.2d 505, 507 (1977); see Farns-
worth, supra note 36, at 876. Corbin has identified one of the chief purposes of contract law
as "secur[ing] the realization of expectations reasonably induced by the expressions of
agreement." 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 16, § 537, at 45. Contract law generally is solicitous of
the reliance and justifiable expectations of contractors and would-be contractors. Reliance,
in the sense that it is used here, is distinguishable from, but has a kinship to, notions of
detrimental reliance that underlie the promissory estoppel theory. The essential difference
is that, in the present context, reliance is the foundation for the establishment of a fully
enforceable contractual relationship, and not for the more limited relief normally associated
with promissory estoppel. See generally Fuller, supra note 30, at 810-12 (discussing basic
principles underlying reliance theory and relationship between concepts of reliance and pri-
vate autonomy).
4' See Stoddard v. Ham, 129 Mass. 383, 385 (1880). In Stoddard, the court observed:
A party cannot escape the natural and reasonable interpretation which must be
put on what he says and does, by showing that his words were used and his acts
done with a different and undisclosed intention .... It is not the secret purpose,
but the expressed intention, which must govern.... A party is estopped to deny
that the intention communicated to the other side was not his real intention.
Id. at 385-86; accord O'Donnell v. Town of Clinton, 145 Mass. 461, 462, 14 N.E. 747, 750
(1888) (party who misrepresented nature of a document to other-an illiterate-was held
bound to his misrepresentation because it induced reliance); Bronaugh, supra note 1, at 243-
44 (estoppel should be imposed to prevent a party from taking advantage of contractual
defects they created).
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form the impression of assent. Accountability, therefore, is not pre-
mised on actual assent. In fact, there has been a failure of agree-
ment between the parties, but a contract is found nevertheless.45
Before a person may be held accountable for an unintended
impression created by her conduct, it is necessary both that some
degree of blame was present on her part, and that some degree of
reliance existed on the part of the other party.46 The definition of
blame in this context must be a flexible one because accountability
need not be grounded in fault.47 The normal conception of fault,
which suggests a deliberate or negligent misrepresentation of in-
tention,4 is too restrictive a standard for accountability since it
implies too strong a requirement of wrongful conduct. For exam-
ple, in Case 2 above, A's deliberate failure to disclose her true in-
tent seems to provide a clear example of fault. The more flexible
concept of blame, however, would also include B's involuntary ac-
tion in Case 1 if A relied upon B's involuntary action and B imme-
diately failed to correct that impression. In Case 4, involving the
differing interpretations of the term "current rate," blame and reli-
ance would be determined by evidence both of the parties' inter-
pretation and of common usage.
Accountability is motivated by the need to protect the justifia-
ble reliance of one party on the acts or utterances of the other.49
'5 1 See C. FRIED, CONTRACT As PROMISE 61 (1981); S. WILLISTON, supra note 31, § 95,
at 181. A constructive mutual assent will be found by the courts when there is no actual
assent but the conduct of one of the parties would lead the other party reasonably to believe
a contract had been formed. See Kabil Devs. Corp. v. Mignot, 279 Or. 151, 157, 566 P.2d
505, 508-09 (1977); Lucy v. Zehmer, 196 Va. 493, 503, 84 S.E.2d 516, 522 (1954). But see
Bronaugh, supra note 1, at 245 (to find a bargain when there is obviously no assent is
incredible).
46 See Moline I.F.C. Finance, Inc. v. Soucinek, 91 Ill. App. 2d 257, 260, 234 N.E.2d 57,
59 (1968). The court in Moline held that whenever one either affirmatively, negatively, in-
tentionally or negligently induces another to believe and have confidence in certain facts,
estoppel arises. Id.; see also Arrow Lathing & Plastering, Inc. v. Schaulat Plumbing Supply
Co., 83 Ill. App. 2d 394, 228 N.E.2d 209, 210 (1967).
47 See 1 CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 1, at § 11-34, at 445. Professors Calamari
and Perillo maintain that a promise or an innocent representation of fact is a sufficient basis
for estoppel. Id.
48 See, e.g., Price v. Louisiana Rural Rehabilitation Corp. 38 F. Supp. 196, 200 (W.D.
La. 1941), afl'd, 134 F.2d 548 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 758 (1943).
" Section 90 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts addresses the doctrine of estop-
pel. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981). In light of the contention in this
Article that estoppel and accountability are similar, see supra text accompanying notes 42-
45, this section can be helpful in discussing accountability. Section 90 states in part:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or for-
bearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce
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Accordingly, accountability should involve a relative evaluation of
the actors' behavior. Each party's justification for using any mis-
leading symbols of intent must be weighed against the justification
of the other party in gleaning the unintended meaning from those
symbols. For example, in Case 1 above, to decide whether the equi-
ties favor A, evidence of A's subjective understanding of the nod,
and B's belief on how it was perceived, is highly relevant. Neither
blame nor reliance can be measured without reference to the fac-
tual context in which the manifestation occurred. This inquiry
must extend, as does the inquiry into the fact of assent, to all per-
tinent evidence, whether subjective or objective, that bears upon
the fact of blame or reliance.
In summary, assent forms the basis of contracts. Practical con-
siderations and the need to protect substantially consensual ar-
rangements have resulted in a distinction between actual assent
and legal assent. Assent need not be comprehensive in order to be
legally effective. Furthermore, where the facts call for it, principles
of accountability will justify the imposition of a contract or con-
tract terms on a party in the absence of actual assent. However,
that does not mean that a court may carelessly disregard the as-
sent policy. Legal assent must have some basis in a factually
demonstrated consensual relationship, and accountability must be
based on factually demonstrated blame and reliance. The substan-
tive rules of contract formation and the procedural rules used in
the adjudication of formation disputes must serve these policies,
and they must do so accurately and efficiently.
In addition to substantive policy considerations, courts must
keep in mind a variety of purely procedural questions. Courts must
employ rules of evidence and process that fairly allocate eviden-
tiary burdens, that permit adequate but not oppressive control of
the factfinding process, and that avoid wasting court time on val-
ueless testimony.50 The objective test has been erected at the point
of confluence of these policies. However, it has been used in a way
such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforce-
ment of the promise.
Id. The concern in § 90 is clearly to protect a party that would act because of a justifiable
reliance on an act of the promisor. See id.
50 See, e.g., Vickers v. Vickers, 553 S.W.2d 768, 770 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977). In Vickers,
the court held that a claim of ambiguity in a contract must be raised by the pleadings and
that in the absence of such a pleading the court will not admit evidence of ambiguity. See
id.; see also Ross v. Burleson, 274 S.W.2d 105, 107 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) (ambiguity in a
contract must be raised in pleadings).
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that deflects and obscures such policies rather than advances them.
The following two sections expand upon the implications of the
assent and reliance policies, and discuss the way in which objective
approaches to formation disputes have detracted from these
policies.
IV. THE OBJEcTIVE THEORY OF CONTRACTS
During the mid-nineteenth century, courts faced with forma-
tion issues began to focus more intently upon external manifesta-
tions to establish intent.51 The movement toward objectivity grew
in strength and reached its peak in the early twentieth century.52 It
came to be formulated as a rule known as the "Objective Theory of
Contract." 53 In a sense, the objective theory of contract is the
forebear of what currently is called the objective test.5 4 Although
" See, e.g., Davison v. Holden, 55 Conn. 103, 112, 10 A. 515, 516 (1887); Benjamin v.
McConnell, 9 Ill. 536, 544 (1847); Stoddard v. Ham, 129 Mass. 383, 385-86 (1880); see also
Williston, supra note 1, at 87. The preference for objective evidence is not an innovation of
the 19th century; it is rooted in both the Roman law and the early common law. See
Chloros, Comparative Aspects of the Intention to Create Legal Relations in Contract, 33
TULANE L. REV. 607, 607-10 (1959); see also M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERI-
CAN LAW 196-201 (1977) (cyclical substitution of subjective and objective criteria during
formative periods of American contract law). For a judicial discussion of the rise of objectiv-
ity in American contract law, see Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R.R., 153 F.2d 757, 760-70 (2d
Cir. 1946 (Frank, J., concurring); Kabil Devs. Corp. v. Mignot, 279 Or. 151, 154, 566 P.2d
505, 507-09 (1977).
52 See, e.g., Brant v. California Dairies, Inc., 4 Cal. 2d 128, 133, 48 P.2d 13, 16 (1935);
Zurich Gen. Accident & Liab. Assur. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 132 Cal. App. 101,
102-03, 22 P.2d 572, 573 (1933). As the cases cited in this Article demonstrate, one cannot
accurately confine the rise or fall of objectivity to precise time periods. A chronological
description of objectivity is no more than a description of the strength and concentration of
trends during particular time periods. Because objectivity has been emphasized in varying
degrees throughout history by different writers and different courts, and since there has
been no universal acceptance or rejection of objectivity in this century, it would be an exag-
geration to speak of clear cycles of objectivity or subjectivity.
" Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R.R., 153 F.2d 757, 761 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank, J., concur-
ring); Industrial Indem. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 34 Cal. 2d 500, 509, 211 P.2d
857, 858 (1949) (Traynor, J., concurring); see Parsons, Law of Contracts, in 2 HISTORICAL
WRITINGS IN LAW & JURISPRUDENCE 6 (1980); see also 1 A. CORBIN, supra note 16, § 106, at
476-77; M. HORWITZ, supra note 51 at 196-201.
"' As is indicated by the contemporary cases cited in this Article, most courts no longer
speak of an objective theory of contracts, preferring to use the term "objective test." See,
e.g., Action Eng'g v. Martin Marietta Aluminum, 670 F.2d 456, 461 (3d Cir. 1982) (en banc);
Fairway Center Corp. v. U.I.P. Corp., 502 F.2d 1135, 1140 (8th Cir. 1974); Chase Manhattan
Bank v. First Marion Bank, 437 F.2d 1040, 1049 (5th Cir. 1971). There are modern excep-
tions, however. Washington courts, for example, still refer to the objective test as the "objec-
tive manifestation theory." See, e.g., Dwelley v. Chesterfield, 88 Wash. 2d 331, 335, 560 P.2d
353, 355 (1977); Alexander & Alexander, Inc. v. Wohlman, 19 Wash. App. 670, 681, 578 P.2d
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the objective theory generally is associated with older cases and
writers, there has never been a clear break away from it. 5 It re-
tains some vitality and is encountered periodically in contempo-
rary cases either in its full-blown form, or in a refined version.",
For the sake of convenient categorization, this Article uses the
term "objective theory" to refer to the strict objectivist approach
more commonly found earlier in this century. The term "objective
test" is used to refer to the modified but less clearly defined ap-
proach that is more commonly found in contemporary cases.
A. The Objective Theory and Assent
The rise of the objective theory has been described by others
and is not fully discussed here.57 It is worth noting, however, that
the objective theory originated in part as a reaction to an earlier
trend in which courts concentrated on the internal element-the
will of the parties-and emphasized the importance of actual as-
sent in contract formation.58 By the latter part of the nineteenth
536 (1978).
I' E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 3.6, at 114; see, e.g., Fairway Center Corp. v. U.I.P
Corp., 502 F.2d 1135, 1140 (8th Cir. 1974); Billmyre v. Sacred Heart Hosp. of Sisters of
Charity, Inc., 273 Md. 638, 642, 331 A.2d 313, 316 (1975); Stark v. Morgan, 602 S.W.2d 298,
302-03 (Tex. 1980).
Since the historical and the contemporary often merge in this area this Article groups
cases on the basis of the judicial attitude they represent, rather than on the basis of their
chronology.
'1 See, e.g., Huntington Beach Union High School Dist. v. Continental Information
Sys., 621 F.2d 353, 356 (9th Cir. 1980). The court in Huntington rejected as inconsistent
with the objective theory evidence of the plaintiff's interpretation of a contract. See id.; see
also Molton, Allen and Williams, Inc. v. Harris, 613 F.2d 1176, 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1980). In
reaching its decision the Molton court viewed the facts at hand in terms of the objective
theory. 621 F.2d at 356.
7 See, e.g., Zell v. American Seating Co., 138 F.2d 641, 646-48 (2d Cir. 1943), rev'd, 322
U.S. 709 (1944); M. HORWITZ, supra note 51, at 188-201; Farnsworth, supra note 36, at 943;
see also Oliphant, Book Review, 19 MICH. L. REV. 358, 360 (1921) (reviewing S. WILLISTON,
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1920)).
58 See Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 984 (2d Cir.
1942); G. GILMORE, DEATH OF CONTRACT 29, 35-43 (1974); Farnsworth, supra note 36, at 943.
Gilmore argues that the objective theory was the product of a scorn felt for the subjective
theory by Holmes and his followers, who succeeded in changing the emphasis of contract
interpretation from the subjective to the objective by misinterpreting 19th century cases.
See G. GILMORE, supra, at 37-38; see also Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARv. L. REV.
553, 577 (1933) (limitations of will theory of contracts led to rejection of notion of will in
contract interpretation).
The subjective theory of contracts emphasizes the will of the parties, and requires ac-
tual agreement between them, or a literal "meeting of the minds," before a contract can be
formed. 1 W. ELLIOT, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 25, 26, 40 (1913). Under
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century, that subjectivism was perceived by many influential
courts and writers as a barrier to the enforcement of promises. 9
Those critics, who have come to be called objectivists, 60 regarded
the subjective standard as unreliable." They considered inquiry
into the minds of the parties to be elusive, and believed that it
created uncertainty and insecurity in commercial dealings.6 2 Be-
cause they believed that the security of commercial transactions
demanded a standard that was external and observable, 63 the ob-
the subjective theory, "[b]oth parties must understand the same thing in the same sense."
Id. § 26; see, e.g., National Bank v. Hall, 101 U.S. 43, 49 (1879).
-9 See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 1, § 2-2 at 23. The authors contend that
the objective theory has been dominant for over a hundred years and that under this theory
a party's subjective intent is ordinarily irrelevant. See id; see also Eustis Mining Co. v. Beer,
Sondheimer & Co., 239 F. 976, 985 (S.D.N.Y. 1917). Judge Learned Hand contended that
giving effect to a party's subjective intent "related only to their state of mind when the
contract was made, and that has nothing to do with their obligations." Id. see also Palmer,
The Effect of Misunderstanding on Contract Formation and Reformation Under the Re-
statement of Contracts Second, 65 MICH. L. REv. 33, 45 (1966). The Article proposes that as
early as 1843 the New York courts used a "reason to know" test known as "Dr. Paley's
rule." Id. This rule was used by the courts as opposed to the subjective theory. See United
States Rubber Co. v. Silverstein, 229 N.Y. 168, 171, 128 N.E. 123, 124 (1920) (a promise is to
be taken in the sense that the promisor had reason to suppose it was understood); Hoffman
v. Aetna Fire Ins. Co., 32 N.Y. 405, 413 (1865). Commentators have maintained that it is the
basis for the objective theory. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 47, at 2-2, at 24 & n.12.
0 See Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R.R., 153 F.2d 757, 761-62 (2d Cir. 1946). The label
"objectivists" inaccurately suggests a cohesive jurisprudential school. In this Article, the
term is used simply to refer to those courts and authors that have adopted or have urged the
adoption of a strict form of the objective theory of contracts. As this Article will indicate,
there are different degrees of objectivism, and some courts have been more inclined to apply
the objective theory than others. See infra notes 96-105 and accompanying text.
61 See Eustis Mining Co. v. Beer, Sondheimer & Co., 239 F. 976, 984-85 (S.D.N.Y.
1917); E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 7.9, at 484-85. Gilmore defends the objective theory
by pointing out the inherent difficulties in the subjective theory. G. GILMORE, supra note 58,
at 29. He states:
[If] "the actual state of the parties minds" is relevant, then each litigated case
must become an extended factual inquiry into what was "intended," "meant,"
"believed" and so on. If, however, we can restrict ourselves to the "externals"
.... then the factual inquiry will be much simplified and in time can be dis-
pensed with altogether as the courts accumulate precedent about recurring types
of permissible and impermissible "conduct."
G. GILMORE, supra note 58, at 42.
62 See, e.g., Stoddard v. Ham, 129 Mass. 383, 386 (1880); see Kabil Devs. Corp. v.
Mignot, 279 Or. 151, 154, 566 P.2d 505, 507 (1977). In Stoddard, the court warned that to
hold that expressed intention is not real intention "would be to put it in the power of the
vendor in every case to defeat the title of the vendee ... by proving that he intended to sell
to another person." Id.; see also G. GILMORE, supra note 58, at 42-43.
OS See Fuller, supra note 30, at 808. But see Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R.R., 153 F.2d
757, 761 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank, J., concurring) (no clear proof that either security of transac-
tions or other socially desirable result would follow application of objective theory).
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jectivists distrusted and eschewed inquiry into the actual intent of
the parties.64
The objectivists overreacted, however, by emphasizing objec-
tivity too heavily and suppressing the subjective element too
fiercely. 5 The objective theory, although largely motivated by a
distrust of subjective evidence, was not merely a procedural rule of
evidentiary selection. It altered the substantive law of contract,
and attacked fundamental contract policy, by declaring that mani-
festations of assent, rather than assent itself, formed the basis of
contract.6 One of the most celebrated judicial expressions of the
objective theory of contracts is that of Judge Learned Hand in
Hotchkiss v. National City Bank of New York:
A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal,
or individual, intent of the parties. A contract is an obligation
attached by mere force of law to certain acts of the parties, usu-
ally words, which ordinarily accompany and represent a known
intent. If, however, it were proved by 20 bishops that either party,
when he used the words, intended something else than the usual
meaning which the law imposes upon them, he would still be
held, unless there were some mutual mistake, or something else of
However, it is surely true that, by making the existence of a contract depend upon the
party seeking enforcement being able to show a true coincidence of wills at the time of
formation, a purely subjective test for assent would severely disrupt the planning and en-
forcement of contract relationships.
11 See Fuller, supra note 30, at 806.
61 See id. at 806-08. According to Fuller, the objectivists took the will theory too liter-
ally, and in their refutation of it, obscured the issue of private autonomy. Id.; see Pacific
Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 69 Cal. 2d 33, 38, 442 P.2d 641,
644-45, 69 Cal. Rptr. 561, 564-65 (1968); 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 16, § 583, at 474-75; Whit-
tier, The Restatement of Contracts and Mutual Assent, 17 CAL. L. R.v. 441, 442-43 (1929).
In his concurring opinion in Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R.R., 153 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1946),
Judge Frank found it ironic that the objectivists, who extolled the value of the free enter-
prise system and the individuality on which it was founded, should pervert that individual-
ity by refusing to consider individualistic evidence, id. at 761 & n.2 (Frank, J., concurring).
In seeking to foster the individualistic value of private contract facilitation, the objectivists
undermined the inquiry into the existence of individual will in contract. Id. (Frank, J.,
concurring).
66 See, e.g., Tallant v. Stedman, 176 Mass. 460, 467, 57 N.E. 683, 686 (1900); see RE-
STATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 3, at 20 (1932); Oliphant, supra note 57, at 360. Williston criti-
cized the rule that intent to form a legal relationship is a requisite for contract formation. 1
S. WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, § 21, at 21-23 (1924). In his view, the consideration
doctrine dispensed with the need for an inquiry into intent, because the presence of consid-
eration justified a finding that a legal relation had been entered. Id. at 21-22. See generally
0. HOLMES, supra note 1, at 110 (legal liability is determined by a man's manifest acts, the
law is indifferent to internal conscience).
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the sort.17
The objective theory advanced the premise that the internal
element in contract should be treated as legally meaningless. Its
adherents declared that contracts were formed not through agree-
ment, but through apparent agreement. 8 The existence of a con-
tract had to be gleaned exclusively from an examination of exter-
nal indicia.6 9
If the internal element is stripped of legal significance, it fol-
lows that subjective evidence is no longer of interest to the
factfinder.70 The objective theory applied in its strictest sense cre-
ated a conclusive presumption that manifestations of assent accu-
rately represent actual assent.71 Accordingly, under the objective
67 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911); see also Eustis Mining Co. v. Beer, Sondheimer &
Co., 239 F. 976, 984 (S.D.N.Y. 1917); Tallan v. Stedman, 176 Mass. 460, 467, 57 N.E. 683,
686 (1900) (undisclosed intent of plaintiff is inadmissible); Stoddard v. Ham, 129 Mass. 383,
386 (1880) (expressed intention, not secret purpose, must govern). According to § 20 of the
Restatement of Contracts, "neither mental assent to the promises in the contract nor real or
apparent intent that the promises shall be binding is essential" to the formation of a con-
tract. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 20 (1932). The essential element is the "manifestation
of mutual assent by the parties." Id. (emphasis added). If the manifestation differs from the
mental intent, the manifestation is controlling. See id. comment a.
68 The objective theory, discussed in the past tense in this Article, remains vital today.
There are many examples of modern courts that unequivocally espouse the objective theory.
See, e.g., Barco Urban Renewal Corp. v. Housing Auth., 674 F.2d 1001, 1008 (3d Cir. 1982);
Leitner v. Braen, 51 N.J. Super. 31, 38, 143 A.2d 256, 260 (1958); Stark v. Morgan, 602
S.W.2d 298, 302-03 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980). In some extreme cases, courts have held that the
manifested intent of the parties should be upheld even if the court believes that the parties
in fact intended something different. See Powel v. Burke, 178 Conn. 384,, 423 A.2d 97, 99
(1979); Illinois Cas. Co. v. Peters, 73 Ill. App. 3d 33, 37, 29 Ill. Dec. 284, 288, 391 N.E.2d 547,
549 (1979).
09 See 3 S. WILLISTON, supra note 31, § 1536, at 2731. According to Williston, "the law
... can be expressed accurately ... by saying that the elements requisite for the formation
of contract are exclusively external." Id.
70 See, e.g., Hotchkiss v. National City Bank, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff'd, 201
F. 664 (2d Cir. 1912), af'd, 231 U.S. 50 (1913); Sullivan v. Phillips, 178 Ind. 164, 165, 98
N.E. 868, 869 (1912); Severance v. Heyl & Patterson, Inc., 308 Pa. 101, 108, 162 A. 171, 173
(1932). But see Woburn Nat'l Bank v. Woods, 77 N.H. 172, 176, 89 A. 491, 493 (1914). In
Woburn, the court, while stressing that overt conduct rather than intent creates the con-
tract, conceded that subjective evidence might sometimes be of interest since it may be
referred to if there is no adequate objective evidence available. See id. If, for example, a
witness is unable to remember overt conduct, the court will receive evidence of intent, which
becomes relevant not because the court cares about the state of mind of the parties, but
because it might help to prove their conduct. Id.
"' See Williston, supra note 1, at 87-88. Williston acknowledged that the objective the-
ory was not a strict presumption, but a rule of law that declared that manifestations of
assent rather than mental intent are the basis of contract liability. See id. The "presump-
tive" nature of the objective test is periodically alluded to by courts, but not all courts share
Williston's confident understanding of the force or nature of the presumption. Some cases,
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theory, subjective evidence became per se irrelevant. 72 The natural
effect of the objective theorists' emphasis on the external was the
weakening of the consensual base of contract 7s--substituting for
actual assent a presumed, and sometimes fictional, assent.7 4 The
self-contradictory perversity of strong objectivity is illustrated by
cases that redefined assent in purely formal terms. For example, in
Barco Urban Renewal Corporation v. Housing Authority, the
court stated:
[T]he polestar of contract interpretation is to ascertain the 'inten-
tions and understanding of the two parties' . . . [a]ll other tools
in aid of interpretation are subordinate to this goal. . . . By in-
tention, courts do not mean the actual subjective intention of the
parties, but the objective manifestations of intent.75
both older and more modern, have stated that the presumption is conclusive. See, e.g., Sa-
lant v. Fox, 271 F. 449, 451 (3d Cir. 1921) (law presumes that parties understand import of
their contract and that they had intention that its terms express); Federal Land Bank v.
Terra Resources, Inc., 373 So. 2d 314, 319-20 (Ala. 1979) (where there are no allegations of
defect in formation of contract its terms, if unambiguous, are conclusive evidence of the
parties' intentions). By contrast, in Transport Indem. Co. v. Seib, 178 Neb. 253, 132 N.W.2d
871 (1965), the court made it clear that it used the word "presumption" in a loose sense to
convey the idea that an objective manifestation (in this case, a writing) creates only a strong
inference that parties intended a contract on its terms, see id. at 260, 132 N.W.2d at 875-76.
In Boat Town U.S.A. v. Mercury Marine Div., 364 So. 2d 15 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), the
court described a written manifestation as the "best evidence of intent and meaning of the
parties." Id. at 17.
72 See Hotchkiss v. National City Bank, 200 F. 287, 293-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff'd, 201
F. 664 (2d Cir. 1912), aff'd, 231 U.S. 50 (1913); Phllip v. Gallant, 62 N.Y. 256, 263 (1875);
Farnsworth, supra note 36, at 945-46. Some cases have sustained objections to the admis-
sion of subjective evidence on the ground that subjective evidence is presumptively irrele-
vant. See, e.g., Farnum v. Whitman, 187 Mass. 381, 383, 73 N.E. 473, 474 (1905); Tallant v.
Stedman, 176 Mass. 460, 466, 57 N.E. 683, 685 (1900).
73 See Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R.R., 153 F.2d 757, 761-62 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank, J.,
concurring); G. GILMORE, supra note 58 at 42-43; Bronaugh, supra note 1, at 220-21.
74 E.g., Barco Urban Renewal Corp. v. Housing Auth., 674 F.2d 1001, 1008 (3d Cir.
1982); Powel v. Burke, 178 Conn. 384, 387, 423 A.2d 97, 99 (1979). Contractual intent under
the objective theory is partially a legal fiction. Fuller observed that, because courts are not
so much concerned with establishing real intent, their inquiry is partially factual and par-
tially legal. L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 88-89 (1967). The inquiry is designed to establish a
form of constructive intent that has both factual and fictitious elements. Id. See generally
id. at 1-48 (nature of legal fictions); 1 W. PAGE, THE LAw OF CONTRACTS § 73, at 92-94
(1920).
7- 674 F.2d 1001, 1008 (3d Cir. 1982) (citations omitted); accord Powel v. Burke, 178
Conn. 384, 387, 423 A.2d 97, 99 (1979) (court will construe intent even when the evidence
indicates that such construction is fictional); Illinois Cas. Co., v. Peters, 73 Ill. App. 3d 33,
35, 391 N.E.2d 547, 549 (1979) (purported intent may not alter otherwise clear and unam-
biguous words in insurance policy); Quenzer v. Quenzer, 225 Kan. 83, 85, 587 P.2d 880, 882
(1978) (according to rules of parol evidence, if property settlement contract is unambiguous,
it must be enforced according to its terms).
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The Barco Urban Renewal court became so engrossed in the exter-
nal utterances that it fictionalized assent and underplayed the im-
portance of assent as an element of contract.
It is useful at this point to refer briefly to the parol evidence
rule and its place in the scheme of objectivist thought.7, The long-
standing discrimination by the common law in favor of written
documents tied in well with the objectivist's penchant for the ex-
ternal. When the objective element of a transaction was recorded
in a written memorial, the objectivist's enthusiasm for the external
was heavily reinforced by the traditional reliance of the law on the
symbolism of the written act 77 and its reverence for the written
word.7 8 The parol evidence rule is not aimed solely at subjective
evidence. The rule also strikes down evidence of objective facts, for
example, prior writings and contemporaneous or prior oral expres-
sions,79 rendering those objective facts inoperative in the face of an
76 The parol evidence rule provides that, when the parties have reduced their agree-
ment to an integrated and complete written memorial, no evidence of oral or prior written
terms may be admitted. See, e.g., Royal Indus. v. St. Regis Paper Co., 420 F.2d 449, 452 (9th
Cir. 1969); International Multifoods Corp. v. D & M Feed & Produce, Inc., 470 F. Supp. 654,
656 (D. Neb. 1979); Graybeal v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 59 F.R.D. 7, 22 (D.D.C. 1973).
" See Patterson, The Interpretation and Construction of Contracts, 64 COLUM. L.
REv. 833, 846 (1964). Patterson distinguishes symbolic acts from non-symbolic acts. A sym-
bolic act is performed in order to denote agreement. For example, the signing of a written
memorial is the creation of a symbol of agreement. A non-symbolic act is motivated by
practical considerations rather than a desire to record and memorialize. For example, the
act of mailing a letter of acceptance is concerned with effecting a practical end rather than
symbolizing an agreement. However, these acts may just as well afford evidence of agree-
ment. The parol evidence rule is premised in part on a belief that a deliberate symbolic act
is usually reliable evidence of underlying intent. Id.
11 See Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Business Credit, Inc., 619 F.2d 1001, 1009 (3d Cir.
1980); see also Smith v. Standard Oil Co., 227 Ga. 268, 278, 180 S.E.2d 691, 697 (1971)
(dictum) (complete written contract may not be contradicted by parol evidence). In Mellon
Bank, the court, emphasizing the necessity of interpreting contracts objectively, noted that
"[tihe strongest external sign of agreement between contracting parties is the words they
use in their written contracts." 619 F.2d at 1009. The court further posited that "the sanc-
tity of the written words of the contract is embedded in the law of contract interpretation."
Id. Another court, borrowing the reasoning of Mellon Bank, declared that the written words
of a contract constitute "the most important manifestation of intent." Consolidated Rail
Corp. v. Providence & Worcester Co., 540 F. Supp. 1210, 1218 (D. Del. 1982); accord Na-
tional Cash Register Co. v. Modern Transfer Co., 224 Pa. Super. 138, 142, 302 A.2d 486, 488
(1973) (courts will not construe terms of contract in manner that conflicts with clear written
agreement); see also Masterson v. Sine, 68 Cal. 2d 222, 226, 436 P.2d 561, 564-65, 65 Cal.
Rptr. 545, 548-49 (1968) (evidence of collateral agreements are barred if they would cer-
tainly have been included in written contract).
7 See Evensen v. Pubco Petroleum Corp., 274 F.2d 866, 871 (10th Cir. 1960) (dictum);
Bank Bldg. & Equip. Corp. of Am. v. Georgia State Bank, 132 Ga. App. 762, 765, 209 S.E.2d
82, 84 (1974). Authorities generally agree that, as a rule of substantive law, the parol evi-
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integrated written agreement.8 0 The parol evidence rule is regu-
larly characterized as a rule of substantive law rather than as a
rule of procedure."s It creates a conclusive presumption that the
writing expresses the actual agreement of the parties. 82 This rejec-
dence rule establishes the primacy of a 'subsequent integrated agreement over previous ut-
terances whether such previous utterances are oral or written. See generally 4 S. WILLISTON,
A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 646, at 1196 (3d ed. 1961 & Supp. 1984) (parol
evidence rule precludes prior extrinsic evidence irrespective of whether it is oral or written).
80 Although it is difficult to advance a uniformly accepted statement of the parol evi-
dence rule, the formulation of the Restatement of Contracts can be used as a guide. The
Restatement provides that, when an agreement is integrated, the parol evidence rule "makes
inoperative to add to or to vary the agreement all contemporaneous oral agreements relating
to the same subject-matter; and also, unless the integration is void, or voidable and avoided,
all prior oral or written agreements relating thereto." RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 237
(1932). The Second Restatement contains a similar rule stated with greater equivocation.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 213(1), (2) (1981). Section 213 provides: "(1) A
binding integrated agreement discharges prior agreements to the extent that it is inconsis-
tent with them; (2) a binding completely integrated agreement discharges prior agreements
to the extent that they are within its scope . Id.; see also Patterson, supra note 77, at
845-47 (discussion of parol evidence rule).
The parol evidence rule has frequently come under attack by commentators on the law
of evidence. See, e.g., J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT COMMON LAW 390
(1898). Thayer observed that there are few things that are "darker than [the parol evidence
rule] . . . or fuller of subtle difficulties." Id. Wigmore observed that the rule is "attended
with confusion and obscurity which make it the most discouraging subject in the whole field
of evidence." J. WIGAIORE, supra note 18, § 2400, at 4.
81 See, e.g., Lee v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 552 F.2d 447, 451 (2d Cir. 1977);
Globe Motors, Inc. v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 328 F.2d 645, 649 (3d Cir. 1964). The parol
evidence rule is characterized as a rule of substantive law because it precludes the admission
of evidence not on evidentiary grounds, but as a matter of law. See In re Gaines' Estate, 15
Cal. 2d 255, 264, 100 P.2d 1055, 1060 (1940) (rule excludes evidence not because of ordinary
reasons "based on the probative value," but, rather, because subsequent agreement "be-
comes the contract of the parties"). See generally 4 S. WILLISTON, supra note 66, at 956 n.
15 (discussing parol evidence). Under the parol evidence rule, prior or contemporaneous
agreements are legally ineffective, and therefore, evidence of them is excluded as irrelevant.
See American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Nicholas, 124 F.2d 477, 479 (10th Cir. 1941); Pitcairn v.
Phillip Hiss Co., 125 F. 110, 113 (3d Cir. 1903); Michigan Chandelier Co. v. Morse, 297
Mich. 41, 48-49, 297 N.W. 64, 67 (1941); see also J. THAYER, supra note 80, at 390, 397; 9 J.
WIGMORE, supra note 18, § 2400, at 3.
82 See International Multifoods Corp. v. D & M Feed & Produce, Inc., 470 F. Supp.
654, 656 (D. Neb. 1979) (when parties create written agreement void of uncertainty, "it is
conclusively presumed" to be complete, and parol evidence is inadmissible to change it);
Graybeal v. American Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 59 F.R.D. 7, 22 (D.D.C. 1973) (writing complete on
its face is integration that cannot be altered by parol evidence). Once the integrated memo-
rial is established in evidence, the fact of agreement on its terms is inferred as a matter of
law and that inference may not be rebutted by evidence to the contrary. See Royal Indus.
v. St. Regis Paper Co., 420 F.2d 449, 452 (9th Cir. 1969) (if parties intended writing to be
"full and final embodiment" of the agreement, parol evidence may not change the
agreement.)
If the parol evidence rule were a rule of evidence, the court would be able to consider
parol evidence that was introduced and received without objection. However, as it is treated
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tion of objective facts not included in the writing bespeaks an even
greater intolerance of evidence relating to subjective intent, which
unquestionably is irrelevant. Therefore, the objectivist's distaste
for the subjective is even more likely to assert itself in circum-
stances in which a written memorial exists.
The objective theory, strictly applied, operated to exclude sub-
jective testimony and objective testimony relating to the subjective
element. Moreover, the objective theory went beyond the exclusion
of evidence by affecting the way in which objective evidence was
interpreted and evaluated. Once objective facts were proved, they
had to be interpreted so that their meaning could be determined.
Under the objective theory, however, the significance of facts could
not be established by subjective explanations of the intent or inter-
pretations of the parties; such subjective explanations inevitably
would involve a return to the forbidden regions of the internal. As
a result, the objective theory required that the evidence be inter-
preted objectively, and provided an external standard of interpre-
tation. 3 That external standard was derived from the reasonable
man test of tort law.8 4 However, transplantation to the law of con-
tract endowed this test with functions that it did not possess in
tort law.
Although the contract version of the reasonable man test did
have some affinity with its tort counterpart in that each was con-
cerned with deciding the question of accountability for conduct,
5
as a rule of substantive law, the evidence should be excluded by the court even in the ab-
sence of objection. National Sur. Corp. v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 268 F.2d 525, 530 (8th
Cir. 1959) (quoting Commerce Trust Co. v. Watts, 360 Mo. 971, 973-74, 231 S.W.2d 817, 820
(1950)); Anderson v. Owens, 205 F.2d 940, 940-41 (9th Cir. 1953). See generally 4 S. WILLIS-
TON, supra note 79, § 631, at 961 (proper application of parol evidence rule requires exclu-
sion of parol evidence even absent objection). There are some courts that apparently will
apply the parol evidence rule to exclude evidence only if there is an objection to its admis-
sion. See First Northwestern Nat'l Bank v. Crouch, 287 N.W.2d 151, 153 (Iowa 1980). Such
an approach, however, is inconsistent with the notion that the parol evidence rule is a rule
of substantive law. See National Sur. Corp., 268 F.2d at 530; Anderson, 205 F.2d at 940-41.
"' Under the objective theory, the language or conduct must be interpreted in its rea-
sonable sense as perceived by the court, irrespective of the actual interpretations or under-
standings of the parties. See W. PAGE, supra note 74, § 83, at 110; 2 S. WILLISTON, supra
note 66, § 602, at 1159-61, § 605, at 1163-64, § 607, at 1167-68.
11 See Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R.R., 153 F.2d 757, 761 (2d Cir. 1946). Judge Frank
attributed the derivation of the objective test to tort law, reasoning that "a desire for legal
symmetry [and] legal uniformity" compelled objectivists to adopt the concept of the "rea-
sonable man" in the field of contract law. Id. Similarly, one court described the construction
of a contract as "viewing the subject of the contract as the mass of mankind would view it."
Peebles v. Prudential Ins. Co., 110 F.2d 76, 78 (6th Cir. 1940).
81 Contract law has recognized, as has tort law, that the primary purpose of the reason-
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the contract test went further, becoming a device for interpreting
and ascertaining the terms of consensual relationships.8 6 The con-
tract test became a substitute for the factual interpretation of
communications between people, thereby changing the character
and quality of the inquiry. The notion of communication implies a
real intercourse between people in which they impart information
to each other. A proper interpretation of that interchange must in-
volve inquiry not only into the signal sent, but also into the recep-
tion of the signal. If the court examines only the facade of the
communication, interpreting its meaning solely on the basis of
outside appearances, the court is not really interpreting the com-
munication at all; rather, it is imposing its own view of how the
signals should have been received.17
The reasonableness standard of the objective theory has not
worked. In cases involving written manifestations of assent, its
shortcomings are particularly acute.88 The added force of the parol
evidence rule in such cases has enabled some courts to usurp the
factfinding function by confusing the distinction between questions
of fact and questions of law.89 These courts have treated the inter-
pretation of the writing as a legal question to be resolved without
reference to extrinsic evidence unless it is not possible to under-
able man test is to assist the court in deciding whether the actions of the tortfeasor deviated
from the standard of behavior that society considers to be responsible. See, e.g., O'Donnell
v. Town of Clinton, 145 Mass. 461, 14 N.E. 747, 751 (1888); Stoddard v. Ham, 129 Mass.
383, 385 (1880); Philip v. Gallant, 62 N.Y. 256, 263, (1875). The accountability basis of the
objective test is discussed in § IV of this Article. See infra notes 111-116 and accompanying
text.
,, See, e.g., Intercounty Constr. Corp. v. District of Columbia, 443 A.2d 29, 32 (D.C.
1982); URS Corp. v. Ash, 101 Ill. App. 3d 229, 235, 427 N.E.2d 1295, 1300 (1981); Aetna Cas.
& Sur. Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 293 Md. 409, 420, 445 A.2d 14, 19 (1982). See generally 1
S. WILLISTON, supra note 66, § 94, at 175 (contract construction ought to be tested by what
reasonable person would have thought contract meant).
1, See C. FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE, 61 (1981).
88 See, e.g., Tose v. First Pa. Bank, N.A., 648 F.2d 879, 900 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 893 (1981). Even though the party to the contract in Tose did not know what the
contract stated, the fact that he signed the contract was held sufficient to bind him. Id.; see
also N & D Fashions, Inc. v. DHJ Indus., 548 F.2d 722, 728 (8th Cir. 1977) (party was bound
by provisions on reverse side of contract, although he did not read them, because he had
signed contract); Coleman v. Holecek, 542 F.2d 532, 535 (10th Cir. 1976) (only where it is
reasonable to believe that other party signed contract by error is contract voidable).
81 See, e.g., Dumas v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Assoc., 654 F.2d 359, 361 (5th Cir. 1981)
(language of contract held to be clear as a matter of law); Quenzer v. Quenzer, 225 Kan. 83,
85, 587 P.2d 880, 882 (1978) (overturning trial court's determination that contract clause
was ambiguous).
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stand the writing.90 Such decisions have distinguished this "legal"
interpretation, referred to as "construction," from the factual in-
terpretation, referred to as "interpretation." 91 The notion that the
interpretation of a written contract is a question of law, however, is
a fiction designed to withdraw the question from the trier of fact.92
A number of cases have rejected this objectivist stance, acknowl-
edging that the intention of the parties is always a question of fact,
even when a written expression exists.93
In addition, the reasonableness standard has not proved capa-
ble of certain application because, unless the courts are uniformly
willing to resolve contract formation disputes in the abstract, the
standard cannot be applied consistently. Even courts that have ap-
plied the objective theory have struggled with the conflict between
the external standard of the objective theory and the realization
that communication always involves a factual context containing
potentially pertinent evidence, including evidence of subjective in-
tent.94 As a result, the law has always been in an unsettled state. It
90 See, e.g., Dumas v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Assoc., 654 F.2d 359, 361 (5th Cir. 1981)
(when language is clear court ascertains intent as a matter of law); Quenzer v. Quenzer, 225
Kan. 83, 85, 587 P.2d 880, 882 (1978) (when contract is unambiguous "it must be enforced
according to its terms" and parol evidence is inadmissible); Armstrong v. Colletti, 88 Wis.
2d 148, 153, 276 N.W.2d 364, 366 (1979) (construction of contract is matter of law for the
court unless contract is ambiguous). Some courts, however, have equivocated on whether
extrinsic evidence should be considered. See, e.g., Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison v. Telex
Corp., 602 F.2d 866, 872-73 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 981 (1979); URS Corp. v. Ash,
101 Ill. App. 3d 229, 233, 427 N.E.2d 1295, 1299 (1981).
"' See Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison v. Telex Corp., 602 F.2d 866, 872 (9th Cir. 1979);
First Nw. Nat'l Bank v. Crouch, 287 N.W.2d 151, 153 (Iowa 1980). Courts have reasoned
that the trier of fact must resolve any factual disputes that arise in the interpretation of a
contract. Cook Indus. v. Community Grain, Inc., 614 F.2d 978, 980 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 952 (1980). However, in the absence of factual ambiguity, courts have reserved to
themselves the task of construing contracts. Steuber Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 646 F.2d 1093,
1098 (5th Cir. 1981); Connie's Constr. Co. v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 207, 210
(Iowa 1975).
92 See 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 16, § 554, at 219-21; Patterson, supra note 77, at 835,
836-37. Patterson suggested that courts have classified interpretation as a question of law
because judges believe that, due to their "education and legal experience," they are better
equipped than laymen "to interpret written instruments and to give them reliability." Id. at
837.
3 See, e.g., Valley Cement Indus, v. Midco Equip. Co., 570 F.2d 1241, 1243 (5th Cir.
1981); Arnold Palmer Golf Co. v. Fugua Indus., Inc., 541 F.2d 584, 588 (6th Cir. 1976). When
the manifestation is not written, most courts treat interpretation of the manifestation as a
question of fact. See, e.g., Sunnyland Mobil Homes, Inc. v. Thompson, 384 So. 2d 1111, 1112
(Ala. Civ. App. 1980); Clayton v. Simpson, 346 So. 2d 457, 459 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977); First
Hartford Realty Corp. v. Ellis, 181 Conn. 25, 29, 434 A.2d 314, 318 (1980).
'4 See, e.g., Cook Indus., Inc. v. Community Grain Inc., 614 F.2d 978, 980 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 952 (1980). In Cook, the court reflected objective philosophy by ruling
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is unclear whether subjective evidence will be considered in inter-
preting manifested conduct, and whether all objective elements in
the context may be examined. A few courts, applying the objective
theory, have sought the meaning of manifestations within the con-
fines of the courtroom. 5 In so doing, they aspire to pure objectivity
by approaching the manifestations in an abstract environment
rather than within the context of evidence of surrounding circum-
stances."6 Most courts, declaring that they seek the interpretation
that would be placed on the conduct by a reasonable man in the
position of the parties, 9 7 have been willing to take some account of
that contract interpretation is normally a question of law for the court. Id. at 980. However,
the court also acknowledged that "interpretation frequently depends heavily on the resolu-
tion of factual disputes," which must be submitted to the trier of fact. Id. Recognizing that
complex contractual language does not easily lend itself to a single objective interpretation,
courts frequently have discussed the propriety of referring to subjective evidence of intent.
See, e.g., Paragon Resources, Inc. v. National Fuel Gas Distribution Corp., 695 F.2d 991,
998-99 (5th Cir. 1983) (if agreement is ambiguous, parol evidence of intent is admissible);
Estate of Mixon v. United States, 464 F.2d 394, 407 (5th Cir. 1972) (if objective facts are
ambiguous, subjective intent becomes relevant); Palipchak v. Kent Constr. Co., 389 Colo.
App. 181, 183, 554 P.2d 718, 719 (1976) (when contract is ambiguous, any evidence that
shows intent is important).
15 See, e.g., Hotchkiss v. National City Bank, 200 F. 287, 293-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), afl'd,
201 F. 664 (2d Cir. 1912), aff'd, 231 U.S. 50 (1913). In Hotchkiss, Judge Hand ruled that
testimony regarding one's understanding of contractual terms is of no consequence because
the obligations imposed by a contract are "attached by the mere force of law." 200 F. at 293.
Judge Hand declared that, "[u]nexpressed intent" is of no significance. Id. In a later case,
Judge Hand again declared evidence regarding subjective intent to be irrelevant, noting that
such evidence "would make not a particle of difference in his obligation." Eustis Mining Co.
v. Beer, Sondheimer & Co., 239 F. Supp. 976, 984 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
" See, e.g., Eustis Mining Co. v. Beer, Sondheimer & Co., 239 F. 976, 984 (S.D.N.Y.
1917) (evidence of subjective intent is irrelevant); Hotchkiss v. National City Bank, 200 F.
287, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) (testimony regarding party's subjective intent is irrelevant), afl'd,
201 F. 664 (2d Cir. 1912), af'd, 231 U.S. 50 (1913); Gendzier v. Bielecki, 97 So. 2d 604, 608
(Fla. 1957) (contract consists of two parties objectively manifesting, rather than harboring,
an identical intent). This has been called the "fly on the wall" theory. See, e.g., Spenser,
Signature, Consent and the Rule in L'Estrange v. Graucob, 32 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 104, 108
(1973) (describing this theory in context of English Law).
07 See, e.g., Intercounty Constr. Corp. v. District of Columbia, 443 A.2d 29, 32 (D.C.
1982); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 293 Md. 409, 420, 445 A.2d 14, 19
(1982); Alexander & Alexander, Inc. v. Wohlman, 19 Wash. App. 670, 681, 578 P.2d 530, 536
(1978). It is sometimes said that the court must establish the meaning that would be at-
tached to the manifestation by a reasonably intelligent person acquainted with all the us-
ages and knowing all the circumstances prior to or contemporaneous with it. See, e.g., URS
Corp. v. Ash, 101 Ill. App. 3d 229, 235, 427 N.E.2d 1295, 1300 (1981). Nevertheless, some
courts describe the context as that surrounding the person to whom the manifestation was
made; that is, the context from his or her standpoint only. See, e.g., Deverho Constr. Co.,
Inc. v. State, 94 Misc. 2d 1053, 1060, 407 N.Y.S.2d 399, 404 (Ct. CI. 1978); Shrum v.
Zeltwanger, 559 P.2d 1384, 1387 (Wyo. 1977). The extent to which this formulation excludes
evidence of a context that would be allowed under the first formulation is unclear.
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the transactional context in interpreting manifestations," or at
least have so professed. 99
Even among the courts that have evinced a willingness to con-
sider transactional context, however, there is no clear agreement
on the question of whether subjective elements may be included in
that context. Many of the cases that recognize the relevance of
contextual evidence generally do so vaguely, in terms that obscure
the court's view regarding evidence of subjective intent as part of
the relevant context. 100 By contrast, other courts clearly express
the view that context does include evidence of subjective intent.10'
" See, e.g., Fairway Center Corp. v. U.I.P. Corp., 502 F.2d 1135, 1140-41 (8th Cir.
1974). In Fairway, the court acknowledged the necessity of finding a "meeting of the
minds," id. at 1140, but noted that such a meeting could be shown objectively from "words
and actions viewed within the context of the situation and surrounding circumstances," id.
at 1141. One court has noted that the "reasonable person" is presumed to know "all the
circumstances surrounding the making of [a] contract." See Intercounty Constr. Corp. v.
District of Columbia, 443 A.2d 29, 32 (D.C. 1982). In this vein, courts have looked to the
trade usage of words in order to interpret contracts. See, e.g., Frigaliment Importing Co. v.
B.N.S. Int'l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116, 117-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (interpreting trade mean-
ing of the word "chicken"); Cedar Park Cemetery Ass'n v. Village of Calumet Park, 398 Il.
324, 334, 75 N.E.2d 874, 880 (1947) (trade usage of engineering terminology). See generally
3 A. CORBIN, supra note 16, § 536, at 36-39 (more courts have resorted to evidence of sur-
rounding circumstances).
9 Some courts have declared the transactional context to be relevant but thereafter
have failed to take it into account. See, e.g., Illinois Cas. Co. v. Peters, 73 Ill. App. 3d 33, 35,
391 N.E.2d 547, 549 (1979); Litwack v. Litwack, 289 Pa. Super. 405, 408, 433 A.2d 514, 515
(1981). In Litwack, the court, while stressing the importance of the context, appeared to
place inordinate emphasis on the plain grammatical meaning of the words used by the par-
ties, and inferred an intent from those words as a matter of legal interpretation. Id. Simi-
larly, in Peters, the court appeared to have considered context, but then refused to take it
into account, preferring to rely on a grammatical meaning of the words in a written memo-
rial of agreement. See 73 Ill. App. 3d at 36-37, 391 N.E.2d at 549-50.
100 See, e.g., M.O.N.T. Boat Rental v. Union Oil, 613 F.2d 576, 579-80 (5th Cir. 1980);
Palipchak v. Kent Constr. Co., 38 Colo. App. 181, 182, 554 P.2d 718, 719 (1976). In
Palipchak, the court ruled that "any" evidence that shows intent is important when a con-
tract is ambiguous. Id. However, in the absence of an indication that subjective evidence
was an issue in the case, it is not clear how literally such a pronouncement should be taken
when made by a court that professes to follow the objective test. Similarly, in M.O.N.T.
Boat Rental, the Fifth Circuit observed that it had considered, apart from the parties' writ-
ten agreement, "other indicia of the parties' intent"; however, the court offered no explana-
tion of what those indicia were or might be. See 613 F.2d at 580. Other courts simply refer
vaguely to extrinsic contextual "facts" without any explanation of that reference. See, e.g.,
Central Jersey Dodge Truck Center v. Sightseer Corp., 608 F.2d 1106, 1109-10 (6th Cir.
1979); see also Stewart v. Worden, 42 Mich. 154, 160, 3 N.W. 876, 880 (1879) (reference
should be made to the "surrounding facts" of the transaction).
1' See Pennzoil Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 645 F.2d 360, 388 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1142 (1982); Berk v. Gordon Johnson Co., 232 F. Supp. 682, 687
(E.D. Mich. 1964); Associated Truck Lines v. Baer, 346 Mich. 106, 112, 77 N.W.2d 384, 387
(1956).
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These courts recognize that they seek actual intent rather than
constructive intent. 0 2 Still other courts have expressly declined to
include evidence of subjective intent.103
The state of the law is further confused in cases involving
written memorials of agreement because courts are swayed by the
influence of the parol evidence rule. The rule often leads courts to
refuse to consider any contextual evidence at all, whether objective
or subjective, once the court has decided that a writing purporting
to be a complete memorial of agreement is facially unambiguous.0 4
A court that follows the "plain meaning" rule'0 5 will confine its in-
terpretation to the face value meaning of the document and will
not move outside the agreement to consider contextual evidence,
whether subjective or objective. 06 Not all courts, however, have
adopted this approach; there are many cases in which courts have
allowed extrinsic evidence even when the writing seemed self-con-
tained and unambiguous on its face. 10 7 There is also a middle
102 See Pennzoil Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 645 F.2d 360, 386 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1142 (1982); Ruhsam v. Ruhsam, 110 Ariz. 326, 328, 518 P.2d
576, 578, modified, 520 P.2d 298 (1974); Bucciero v. Drinkwater, 131 Mass. App. 551, 554,
434 N.E.2d 1315, 1317 (1982). Compare NTA Nat'l, Inc. v. DNC Servs. Corp., 511 F. Supp.
210, 221 (D.D.C. 1981) (subjective extrinsic evidence considered notwithstanding unambigu-
ous writing) with In re Concrete Structures Inc., 23 Bankr. 605, 611 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1982)
(testimony about parties' intent may be heard when contract is ambiguous).
103 See, e.g., Reprosystem, B.V. v. SCM Corp., 522 F. Supp. 1257, 1275 (S.D.N.Y. 1981),
modified, 727 F.2d 257 (1984); Brown Bros. Elec. Contractors, Inc. v. Beam Constr. Corp.,
41 N.Y.2d 397, 399, 361 N.E.2d 999, 1001, 393 N.Y.S.2d 350, 352 (1977); Mencher v. Weiss,
306 N.Y. 1, 7, 114 N.E.2d 177, 180-81, 28 N.Y.2d 1 (1953).
104 See Kravitz v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 453 F. Supp. 381, 383 (E.D. Pa. 1978)
(when contract is unambiguous, court may not look beyond its plain language); Bing v. Gen-
eral Motors Acceptance Corp., 237 F. Supp. 911, 914 (E.D.S.C. 1965) (extrinsic evidence is
inadmissible when contract is unambiguous); Proffitt v. Sitton, 244 S.C. 206, 210, 136 S.E.2d
257, 259 (1964) (unambiguous contracts are construed according to terms used); see also
supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
101 See National Sur. Corp. v. Western Fire & Indem. Co., 318 F.2d 379, 387 (5th Cir.
1963). Generally, the plain meaning rule holds that when the meaning of a contract is clear
and unambiguous, the terms are not subject to construction by the court. See id. As such,
the meaning of the contract must be determined from the contract itself without consider-
ing the circumstances surrounding the transaction. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra
note 1, at 177: E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 7.11, at 501.
01 See, e.g., Caporale v. Mar Les, Inc., 656 F.2d 242, 244 (7th Cir. 1981); Dumas v. First
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 654 F.2d 359, 361 (5th Cir. 1981); Quenzer v. Quenzer, 225 Kan. 83,
85, 587 P.2d 880, 882 (1978).
107 See, e.g., S.A. Empresa v. Boeing Co., 641 F.2d 746, 751 (9th Cir. 1981); Brobeck
Phleger & Harrison v. Telex Corp., 602 F.2d 866, 871 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 981
(1979); Western Sec. Co. v. National Reserve Life Ins. Co., 570 F.2d 269, 271-72 (8th Cir.
1978); cf. Hawes Office Sys. v. Wang Laboratories, 524 F. Supp. 610, 614 (E.D.N.Y. 1981)
(extrinsic evidence permitted, but writing creates presumption of agreement on its terms).
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ground occupied by courts that do not seem to know where they
stand.'0 8
The "plain meaning" approach, like other constructions be-
loved of the objectivists, is a fiction designed to avoid factual in-
quiry.109 Its unrealistic qualities are apparent to anyone who recog-
nizes that dictionary definitions of words do not invariably convey
the meaning intended by either or both of the parties. A court does
not seek the true meaning of the parties' utterances by examining
a dictionary. An apparently clear grammatical interpretation of
words may become less clear once the intention with which they
were used is explained. A cursory "plain meaning" treatment cre-
ates the illusion that interpretation is a mechanical exercise, and it
masks ambiguity by suppressing the inquiry into possible alterna-
tive meanings."'
B. The Objective Theory and Accountability,
Although Williston underplayed the requirement of reliance as
a basis of the objective theory,"' and rejected its estoppel paral-
lel, 2 protecting justifiable expectations is clearly a basic rationale
behind the objective theory." 3 However, the objective theory does
not adequately protect such expectations because it tends to pre-
clude inquiry into facts that would establish reliance and grounds
for accountability for conduct.
I08 See, e.g., Central Jersey Dodge Truck Center v. Sightseer Corp., 608 F.2d 1106,
1109-10 (6th Cir. 1979). The Sightseer court initially noted that, if the contract is unambig-
uous, "the court has no right to look to extrinsic evidence to determine [the parties'] in-
tent." Id. at 1109 (quoting DeVries v. Brydges, 57 Mich. App. 36, 41, 225 N.W.2d 195, 198
(1974)). Later in the opinion, however, the court observed that "[the parties' intention...
is to be ascertained by construing it in light of circumstances . . . and the manifest intent
must prevail over the literal sense of the terms." Id. at 1110.
109 The plain meaning approach has been criticized as a futile and misleading search for
certainty in the written word. See, e.g., Masterson v. Sine, 68 Cal. 2d 222, 226, 436 P.2d 561,
564, 65 Cal. Rptr. 545, 548 (1968); 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 16, § 536, at 26; J. THAYER, supra
note 80, at 427-28.
10 See, e.g., Ruhsam v. Ruhsam, 110 Ariz. 326, 328, 518 P.2d 576, 578 (1974); Master-
son v. Sine, 68 Cal. 2d 222, 226, 436 P.2d 561, 564, 65 Cal. Rptr. 545, 548 (1968); Kronisch v.
Howard Sav. Inst., 154 N.J. Super. 576, 586, 382 A.2d 64, 69 (1977).
" See Williston, supra note 1, at 88.
112 See id. Williston rejected the estoppel parallel because he considered it too confin-
ing, and did not want the application of objective standards to be qualified by inquiry into
the existence of detrimental action in reliance upon the manifestation. See id. Other writers,
however, have recognized the analogy between estoppel and objectivity. See W. PAGE, supra
note 74, § 73, at 92-94; Bronaugh, supra note 1, at 243-44; Whittier, supra note 65, at 441.
13 See Farnsworth, supra note 36, at 869.
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Because the objective theory seeks the meaning of manifesta-
tions through the eyes of a reasonable man,114 courts often must
rely on their own perceptions of what an objective interpretation
would be, without any reference to the actual understanding of ei-
ther party. There are exceptions recognized by the objectivists, but
they are confined to clear-cut categories of cases involving special
circumstances. 1 5 In the absence of those special circumstances,
once the court has decided upon its own interpretation of an utter-
ance, it will assume that the party to whom the utterance was
made reacted to it in the same way. In short, although protection
of justifiable expectations is one of the motivations behind the ob-
jective theory, the objectivists' distaste for subjective evidence has
resulted in a tendency for courts to construct those expectations
instead of inquiring into them.11 6 The objective theory generalizes
and abstracts reliance so that it flows as a matter of legal inference
from the court's own understanding of the utterance. The actual
reliance of the real party fades into irrelevance.
C. The Failure of the Objective Theory
The goals of the objective theory are respectable; the theory
aims at facilitating the enforcement of seriously intended relation-
ships by streamlining the factfinding process and by protecting re-
"' See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
1,5 See infra notes 119-121 and accompanying text. Even objectivists generally would
concede that if one party did not intend assent, and the other knew of that lack of inten-
tion, the absence of assent would preclude formation even if an objective observer of the
transaction would reasonably have believed that a contract was concluded. See O'Neill v.
Corporate Trustees Inc., 376 F.2d 818, 820 (5th Cir. 1967); Chiles v. Good, 41 S.W.2d 738,
739 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931), afl'd, 57 S.W.2d 1100 (Comm'n Civ. App. 1933); 1 S. WmLISTON,
supra note 66, § 21, at 23. A similar approach has been adopted in cases in which one party
knew or should have known of the other's unilateral mistake. See, e.g., Peerless Casualty Co.
v. Housing Auth., 228 F.2d 376, 379 (5th Cir. 1955); Jansen v. United States, 344 F.2d 363,
370 (Ct. Cl. 1965); M.F. Kemper Constr. Co. v. Los Angeles, 37 Cal. 2d 696, 700, 235 P.2d 7,
11 (1951). Some objectivist courts have recognized a further exception for instances in which
there is shared subjective intent. See, e.g., McConnell v. Lamontagne, 82 N.H. 423, 425, 134
A. 718, 719 (1926); Leonard v. Washington Employers, Inc., 77 Wash. 2d 271, 278, 461 P.2d
538, 543 (1969); 1 S. WILLISTON, supra note 66, § 21, at 23.
116 See supra notes 65-75 & 87-110 and accompanying text. In some cases, particularly
those in which there has been a written memorial, courts have refused to consider even
shared subjective intent when that intent differed from the court's interpretation of the
manifested conduct. See, e.g., Eustis Mining Co. v. Beer, Sondheimer & Co., 239 F. 976, 984
(S.D.N.Y. 1917); Hotchkiss v. National City Bank, 200 F. 287, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff'd,
201 F. 664 (2d Cir. 1912), aff'd, 231 U.S. 50 (1913); Robison v. Fickle, 167 Ind. App. 651, 657,
340 N.E.2d 824, 829 (1976).
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liance on the reasonable meaning of manifested conduct. Neverthe-
less, the theory has severe shortcomings. Repudiation of the
internal element in contract harms the assent policy that underlies
contract law, while it clumsily guards not actual, but formalized,
expectations. The objective theory is too blunt an instrument for
the delicate task of formation adjudication. Although its exclusion
of subjective evidence will, in some cases, insulate the factfinder
from distracting, self-serving testimony, the theory imposes a blan-
ket prohibition on a whole class of facts that often will be perti-
nent to the resolution of disputes. Although it seeks to protect reli-
ance on overt conduct, the objective theory generates assumptions
about reliance without permitting factual inquiry into the actual
interpretations of the parties. Although it holds individuals ac-
countable for their actions, it does so without hearing their own
explanations of their conduct.
In short, the objective theory forecloses factual inquiry and
circumvents the factfinding process. It demands an intense concen-
tration on the external, and compels a selective approach to the
facts of the transaction. As a result, it stylizes and abstracts the
contractual relationship, and changes the basis of contract from as-
sent and accountability to a mechanically constructed verisimili-
tude of those elements.
Because the objective theory created rules of law that diverge
from deeply ingrained underlying contract policies, it has not been
widely accepted, and has never been applied with conceptual con-
sistency. 117 Even avowed objectivists have recognized exceptional
situations in which subjective evidence is relevant." 8 In some
117 See, e.g., United States v. Roberts, 436 F. Supp. 553, 557-58 (E.D. Tex. 1977) (court
seems to apply both subjective and objective tests in tax agreement case); Citizens Utils. Co.
v. Wheeler, 156 Cal. App. 2d 423, 432, 319 P.2d 763, 769 (1958) (while court claims to apply
objective test, it declines to review trial court finding that there was no "meeting of the
minds"); Reagan v. Bruff, 49 Tex. Civ. App. 226, 228, 108 S.W. 185, 187 (1908) (rule in
construing contract is to determine what parties themselves meant, but meaning is to be
determined by what they said and not what they intended).
18 See supra note 115 and accompanying text; see also Whittier, supra note 65, at 444-
45 (evidence of subjective intent is necessary to resolve disputes concerning unilateral con-
tracts). In addition, even objectivists balk at the imposition of a contract on a person who
had no intention of entering into a contract, but who unconsciously acted in a way that gave
rise to an apparent manifestation of contractual intent. Therefore, the objective theory gen-
erally has been regarded as limited by the requirement that the manifestation be inten-
tional, so that no contractual liability can arise from an unconscious act unless that act gave
rise to an estoppel. See 1 S. WILLISTON, supra note 66, § 35, at 53-54, id., § 95a, at 182. The
limitation is a narrow one, however, and as long as the act was intentional and conscious, it
is not necessary that the actor actually appreciates and understands its effects or legal im-
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cases, recourse to subjective evidence has been explained on the
ground that obvious fairness, policy, or common sense demand
mitigation of the rule. 119 Admission of subjective evidence also has
been justified on the ground that the objective manifestations were
either unclear or too ambiguous for objective interpretation. 2 °
Failing all else, it is sometimes explained on the basis that the con-
tradictory rules are holdovers from the subjective test that has
never been fully put to rest.12 1 As the discussion in this and the
plications. Id., § 21, at 42-43.
Notions of fairness have prevented courts from imposing the objective meaning of a
manifestation on an actor when the other party knew of the actual intent of the actor. See,
e.g., O'Neill v. Corporate Trustees, Inc., 376 F.2d 818, 820 (5th Cir. 1967); M.F. Kemper
Constr. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 37 Cal. 2d 696, 702, 235 P.2d 7, 11 (1951); Ardis v. Grand
Rapids & Ind. Ry., 200 Mich. 400, 414, 167 N.W. 5, 9 (1918).
Relaxation of the objective theory is also commonly found in cases of duress, fraud, or
mutual or unilateral mistake. See Shrum v. Zeltwanger, 559 P.2d 1384, 1387 (Wyo. 1977);
see also Woburn Nat'l Bank v. Woods, 77 N.H. 172, 175, 89 A. 491, 492 (1914) (dictum);
Williston, supra note 1, at 91; Kessler & Fine, Culpa in Contrahendo, Bargaining in Good
Faith and Freedom of Contract: A Comparative Study, 77 HARv. L. REV. 401, 426, 434
(1964) (courts rely on "discredited" subjectivist interpretation to avoid "socially undesirable
results," and to prevent unconscionable loss to one party); Sharp, Williston on Contracts, 4
U. Cm. L. REV. 30, 31-39 (1936) (discussing need for qualified objective test when adjudicat-
ing unilateral mistake problems).
11" See, e.g., Cochran v. Whitby, 196 Minn. 60, 68, 264 N.W. 427, 431 (1935). In
Cochran, a man abandoned his wife and disappeared under circumstances that indicated
suicide, and subsequently remarried in another community. Id. at 61, 264 N.W. at 428. He
remarried again after the death of his second "wife." Id. He later took out an insurance
policy payable to his "wife." Id. at 62, 264 N.W. at 429. Eleven years later he actually did
commit suicide. Id. at 65, 264 N.W. at 428. In a suit for the insurance proceeds by his
original wife against his third wife, the court found, despite the unambiguous term "wife,"
which objectively meant the original wife, that the third wife should recover. Id. at 67, 264
N.W. at 431. According to the court, it was "obvious" that he "did not intend his real wife
to take anything as beneficiary." Id. at 68, 264 N.W. at 431.
Subjective evidence is used as a policy matter when, for instance, parties ascribe a
meaning to a word that, because of the particular trade of the parties, means something
different from its ordinary meaning. See Hurst v. W.J. Lake & Co., 141 Or. 306, 310, 16 P.2d
627, 629 (1932).
120 See, e.g., Casper v. Metal Trades Inc., 604 F.2d 299, 300-01 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 981 (1979); Gulf Fishing & Boating Club, Inc. v. Bender, 370 So. 2d 1026, 1028
(Ala. Civ. App. 1979). In Bender, the court found the terms of a contract to operate a ma-
rina to be ambiguous and thus looked at the intent of the parties as evidenced from the
whole contract. Bender, 370 So. 2d at 1028; see also RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 71(a), (b)
(1932); 1 S. WILLISTON, supra note 66, § 95, at 178-79; Williston, supra note 1, at 91. Profes-
sor Williston, in acknowledging an exception to the objective theory for lack of clarity or
ambiguity, stressed that subjective intent is used, not because it is of primary importance,
but because the external act cannot be understood without it. See id.; see also Woburn Nat'l
Bank v. Woods, 77 N.H. 172, 176, 89 A. 491, 493 (1914) (evidence of intent with which words
were spoken may shed light on manner of conversation).
121 See Chain v. Wilhelm, 84 F.2d 138, 140 (4th Cir. 1936), rev'd, 300 U.S. 31 (1937);
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next section shows, there have always been courts that have chal-
lenged the premises of the objective theory. Although remnants of
the objective theory remain,'22 these remnants do not form the ba-
sis of a comprehensive approach to formation adjudication. The
following section attempts to describe the influence of the objec-
tive theory in contemporary law.
V. THE OBJECTIVE TEST-OBJECTIVITY IN CONTEMPORARY
CONTRACT LAW
Although it is difficult to evaluate the importance of objectiv-
ity in modern contract law, it is clear that most modern courts do
not concentrate on objectivity as dogmatically as did the early pro-
ponents of the objective theory of contract.123 Nevertheless, the ob-
jective theory is not purely historical. Statements of the doctrine
linger, particularly quotations of influential objectivist courts and
writers.12  Although courts have become increasingly conscious of
New Headly Tobacco Warehouse Co. v. Gentry's Ex'r, 307 Ky. 857, 861, 212 S.W.2d 325, 327
(1948). The rule that a revocable offer terminates at the offeror's death, whether or not
there is notice of that death, is based on the subjective requirement of intent and is contrary
to the objective theory of contract. Chain v. Wilhelm, 84 F.2d at 140; New Headly Tobacco
Warehouse, 307 Ky. at 859, 212 S.W.2d at 327; see also S. WILLISTON, supra note 66, § 62 at
110-11.
122 See, e.g., Pan Am. World Airways v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 505 F.2d 989, 1003
(2d Cir. 1974) (insurance writers' "subjective or hidden intent is not competent to determine
the meaning of the words they employed"); Reed, Wible and Brown, Inc. v. Mahogany Run
Dev. Corp., 550 F. Supp. 1095, 1099 (D. St. Croix 1982) (basic tenet of contract law that
subjective intent of parties to contract is immaterial); Hancock Paper Co. v. Hancock Int'l
Corp., 424 F. Supp. 285, 289 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (examining subjective intent of party to con-
tract held violative of "basic contract law"), af['d mem., 565 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1977).
123 Compare Charbonnages de France v. Smith, 597 F.2d 406, 414-15 (4th Cir. 1979)
(contemporary formulation of objective test looks to intentions manifested in negotiations
rather than those undisclosed) and Pan Am. World Airways v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co.,
505 F.2d 989, 1003 (2d Cir. 1974) (subjective or hidden intent cannot be considered to deter-
mine meaning of words used) and Brown Bros. Elec. Contractors, Inc. v. Beam Constr.
Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 397, 399, 361 N.E.2d 999, 1001, 393 N.Y.S.2d 350, 352 (1977) (in determin-
ing whether parties entered contract, objective manifestations of intent are to be examined
in light of all circumstances) with Brant v. California Dairies, Inc., 4 Cal. 2d 128, 133, 48
P.2d 13, 16 (1935) (outward manifestation of assent is controlling and undisclosed intentions
of parties are immaterial) and Deitrick v. Sinnott, 189 Iowa 1002, 1009, 179 N.W. 424, 427-
28 (1920) (person cannot avoid contract because he was joking if listener reasonably be-
lieved he was serious) and Right Printing Co. v. Stevens, 107 Vt. 359, 365, 179 A. 209, 212
(1935) (term in contract cannot be altered because of one party's mental reservation).
124 See, e.g., Reprosystem, B.V. v. SCM Corp., 522 F. Supp. 1257, 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(quoting Judge Hand's famous "twenty bishops" illustration of objectivist contract interpre-
tation in Hotchkiss v. National City Bank, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff'd, 201 F. 664
(2d Cir. 1912), afl'd, 231 U.S. 50 (1913)); Brown Bros. Elec. Contractors, Inc. v. Beam Con-
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the shortcomings of a rigid objective test, the movement away from
an intensive concern for objectivity has been uneven and difficult
to generalize.
While some courts have adhered tenaciously to the objective
theory, 125 others have rejected it firmly, acknowledging that since
contracts involve both internal and external elements, formation
disputes must be resolved on the basis of all available evi-
dence-both objective and subjective. 126 However, most contempo-
rary courts have not taken a firm stance on the scope of objectivity
in modern law. The typical approach is a pragmatic one that ac-
knowledges the existence of an objective test by placing principal
value on the external element, while according some recognition to
the relevance of the internal element. 27 This pragmatism has er-
str. Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 397, 399, 361 N.E.2d 999, 1001, 393 N.Y.S.2d 350, 351 (1977) (same);
see also M.O.N.T. Boat Rentals Servs. v. Union Oil Co., 613 F.2d 576, 579 (5th Cir. 1980)
(quoting Williston); Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S Int'l Sales, 190 F. Supp. 116, 117
(S.D.N.Y. 1960) (quoting Holmes). Some contemporary courts continue to rely on the objec-
tivist assertions of the Restatement of Contracts. See, e.g., Harty v. Bye, 258 Or. 398, 403,
483 P.2d 458, 461 (1971).
125 See, e.g., Barco Urban Renewal Corp. v. Housing Auth., 674 F.2d 1001, 1008 (3d Cir.
1982); Sands v. Sands, 252 Md. 137, 145, 249 A.2d 187, 191 (1969); P.J. Carlin Constr. Co. v.
Whiffen Elec. Co., 66 App. Div. 2d 684, 685, 411 N.Y.S.2d 27, 28 (1st Dep't 1978); see also
supra notes 68, 90, and 106. Adherence to the objective theory is even more vigorous in
cases involving written manifestations because the parol evidence rule adds force to the
court's aversion to evidence that is both subjective and extrinsic to the written memorial.
See, e.g., Gendzier v. Bielecki, 97 So.2d 604, 608 (Fla. 1957); Marskill Specialties, Inc. v.
Barger, 428 N.E.2d 65, 69 (Ind. 1982); Bernstein v. Kapneck, 290 Md. 452, 460, 430 A.2d
602, 606 (1981). See generally supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
126 See, e.g., Pennzoil Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 645 F.2d 360, 388 (5th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1142 (1982). Since courts are compelled to give effect to
the parties' intentions, ascertaining this intent is the aim of contract interpretation. See id.
at 388. In Pennzoil, even though the contract was not ambiguous on its face, the court
attempted to place itself in the position of the contracting parties by considering the com-
mercial setting of the contract and the circumstances that had changed since the formation
of the contract. See id. Moreover, in response to one party's plea that the contract be inter-
preted according to its "plain meaning," the court declared that "the 'plain meaning' posi-
tion . . .ignores the parties' intentions or presumes 'a degree of verbal precision presently
unattainable by our language.'" Id. (quoting Lucie v. Kleen-Leen, Inc., 499 F.2d 220, 221
(7th Cir. 1974), overruled, Sunstream Jet Express, Inc. v. International Air Serv. Co., 734
F.2d 1258 (7th Cir. 1984)); accord Stevens v. Fanning, 59 IlM. App. 2d 285, 290, 207 N.E.2d
136, 139 (1965) (intent is determined by giving contract fair and reasonable interpretation
(objective), yet contract should be enforced according to mutually understood terms
(subjective)).
Even during the height of the objectivists' influence, some courts considered subjective
evidence. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Hoffman, 212 App. Div. 531, 532, 208 N.Y.S. 734, 735 (4th
Dep't 1925) (to ascertain parties' intent, court puts itself in position of parties and looks at
language, context, and surrounding circumstances).
127 See, e.g., Caporale v. Mar Les, Inc., 656 F.2d 242, 244 (7th Cir. 1981); Chase Man-
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oded firm rules and has made the search for a precise, generally
applicable formulation of the modern objective test extremely
difficult.
Apart from the inevitable conflict among different courts,
there are many cases that are inarticulate and difficult to interpret,
and that fail to indicate, either through doctrinal exposition or
through clear demonstration, the scope and impact of the objective
test. 2 " In some opinions, courts seem to have recited objectivist
maxims without any indication that they have considered and
adopted the philosophical position that motivated the maxims, so
that the maxims seem to be used rhetorically. 129 In many cases, the
reader must question the doctrinal sincerity of the court when it
holds in favor of an objective test because the facts of the case
exhibit no conflict between external and internal elements. There
hattan Bank v. First Marion Bank, 437 F.2d 1040, 1047 (5th Cir. 1971); Hawes Office Sys.,
Inc. v. Wang Laboratories, 524 F. Supp. 610, 614 (E.D.N.Y. 1981); see also Lubrication &
Maintenance, Inc. v. Union Resources Co., 522 F. Supp. 1078, 1081 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (con-
tract is not governed by unexpressed subjective intent); Intercounty Constr. Corp. v. Dis-
trict of Columbia, 443 A.2d 29, 32 (D.C. 1982). In Intercounty Construction Corp., the court
stated that the first step in ascertaining the meaning of disputed contract terms is to deter-
mine "what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have thought the dis-
puted language meant." 443 A.2d at 32. The court observed further, however, that the sub-
jective intent of the parties entering the contract sheds light on the reasonable meaning. Id.
Another court has held that although the subjective intent of the parties is relevant in
resolving contract disputes, this intent is arrived at not by analyzing hidden views, but
rather by analyzing a party's outward acts and conduct. See Lubrication & Maintenance,
Inc., 522 F. Supp. at 1081.
.28 It is unclear whether objectivity is regarded by contemporary courts as a matter of
substantive law. Some courts, including the highest courts of California and New York, can-
didly categorize the objective test as a rule for regulating evidence rather than a rule of
substantive law. See Masterson v. Sine, 68 Cal. 2d 222, 225, 436 P.2d 561, 565, 65 Cal. Rptr.
545, 548 (1968); Braten v. Bankers Trust Co., 60 N.Y.2d 155, 162, 456 N.E.2d 802, 805, 468
N.Y.S.2d 861, 864 (1983). That some courts use objectivity to regulate evidence can be seen
in cases that distinguish between subjective intent, which is deemed relevant, and evidence
of subjective intent, which is deemed inadmissible. See, e.g., Evans v. Mo-Kan Teamsters
Pension Fund, 519 F. Supp. 9, 13 (W.D. Mo. 1980), aff'd, 655 F.2d 900 (8th Cir. 1981);
Mullen v. Christiansen, 642 P.2d 1345, 1350 (Alaska 1982); Stevens v. Fanning, 59 Ill. App.
2d 285, 290, 207 N.E.2d 136, 139 (1965). On the basis of that distinction, some courts recog-
nize that subjective intent must be sought in interpreting an agreement between the parties,
yet declare, in accordance with the objective test, that such intent must be gleaned only
from objective manifestations, not from the testimony of a party on his or her state of mind.
See, e.g., Evans, 519 F. Supp. at 13; Mullen, 642 P.2d at 1350; Stevens, 59 Ill. App. 2d at
290, 207 N.E.2d at 139.
12 See, e.g., Hotel Riviera, Inc. v. Torres, 97 Nev. 399, 401, 632 P.2d 1155, 1157 (1981)
(agreement results not from "parties' having meant the same thing but on their having said
the same thing") (quoting Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 464 (1887));
Maples v. Erck, 630 S.W.2d 488, 490 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982) (effect must be given to intention
of parties as expressed).
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are, for example, a number of cases in which courts have "applied"
the objective test to decide a case that apparently involved no sub-
jective evidence.13 ° In those cases, it is unclear whether the court
was expressing a preference for objective evidence by way of clear
dictum, or whether it was merely indulging in the thoughtless rep-
etition of a doctrinaire formula that had no practical implications
on the facts.
In some cases, the use of the objective test seems to be based
not on a belief in objectivist doctrine, but on expediency. The test
is used to exclude evidence that the court wants to avoid either
because it is not credible or for some other reason. There are, for
example, a number of cases in which it is obvious that although the
court purports to exclude subjective evidence on the basis of the
objective test, the true reason for rejecting the evidence is that the
court has found the evidence unconvincing. 1 1 In other cases,
courts have used the objective test to achieve goals of trial manage-
ment or jury control. 32 It is sometimes expedient for a court to
'o See, e.g., Estate of Savage v. Golub, 73 Ill. App. 3d 656, 659, 392 N.E.2d 263, 266
(1979); General Corrosion Servs. Corp. v. "K" Way Equip. Co., 631 S.W.2d 578, 580 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1982); Maples v. Erck, 630 S.W.2d 488, 490 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982). In Savage, the
court professed to apply the objective theory when the party whose intent was at issue was
deceased at the time of suit. 73 Ill. App. 3d at 660, 392 N.E.2d at 266-67. In General Corro-
sion, although the court professed to apply the objective test, its decision does not indicate
whether either party offered subjective evidence or other contextual facts bearing upon the
meaning of the contract language; the grammatical meaning of the word "lost" comprised all
the evidence the court considered. See 631 S.W.2d at 580. A similarly irrelevant reference to
the objective test is found in Maples, in which the court applied the objective test to a case
in which no subjective evidence was available since the contracting parties were dead. See
630 S.W.2d at 491.
131 See, e.g., NTA Nat'l, Inc. v. DNC Servs. Corp., 511 F. Supp. 210, 223 (D.D.C. 1981)
(examining, but excluding as irrelevant, subjective intent of a party); Tentindo v. Locke
Lake Colony Ass'n, 120 N.H. 593, 599, 419 A.2d 1097, 1101 (1980) (validity of plaintiff's self-
contradictory testimony not in issue because intent of parties is judged by "objective exter-
nal criteria"); Dwelley v. Chesterfield, 88 Wash. 2d 331, 335, 560 P.2d 353, 355-56 (1977) (en
banc) (petitioner's subjective impressions regarding divorce agreement deemed inadmissible
because they were meaningless).
132 See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 3.6, at 116, id. § 7.14, at 515-17. The objective
theory tends to hold the parties to linguistic usage that is accepted as normal, a matter of
fact that arguably falls within the province of a jury. Id. § 3.6, at 116. However, if the
contract is integrated and the intent of the parties may be gathered from the agreement,
interpretation is an issue for the court and not the jury. See, e.g., General Wholesale Beer
Co. v. Theodore Hamm Co., 567 F.2d 311, 313 (5th Cir. 1978) (if terms of contract are
unambiguous, interpretation is for judge, not jury); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Turner Constr.
Co., 2 N.Y.2d 456, 460, 141 N.E.2d 590, 593, 161 N.Y.S.2d 90, 93 (1957) (mere assertion that
otherwise clear language has different meaning is not enough to raise triable question of
fact).
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reject testimony on the basis of a legal rule rather than on grounds
of credibility. For example, when subjective evidence is tendered in
the context of a summary judgment application, its exclusion on
the grounds of a legal rule of inadmissibility will allow the court to
grant summary judgment. If the court admits the evidence, it will
generate a factual dispute that could preclude disposition of the
case by summary judgment.133 Although these goals might be
worthwhile, the use of an unarticulated and generalized objective
test to achieve them leads to confusion and unpredictability.
The same pragmatism is evident in cases that attempt to move
away from a more strictly objective approach. Instead of asserting
a clear doctrinal position, some courts seem to soften the impact of
the objective approach only to the extent needed to achieve a par-
ticular result in a particular case.' 34 The result reached may be
fair, but the court misses an opportunity to clarify legal rules. The
same limited, tentative approach is apparent in the treatment of
the parol evidence rule. While many courts express dissatisfaction
with the idea that it is possible to interpret a written memorial
without recourse to external evidence, the same courts continue to
apply the rule in one form or another.' 35 Other courts, circum-
"' See Interocean Shipping Co. v. National Shipping & Trading Corp., 523 F.2d 527,
534 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1054 (1976). In Interocean, the court stated that a
contract requires a "meeting of the minds." Id. Whether there is such a meeting of the
minds is a question of fact for the jury, which precludes summary judgment. See, e.g., Seitz-
ingers, Inc. v. National Bank, 490 F. Supp. 340, 342-43 (D.D.C. 1980) (preclusion of sum-
mary judgment may have been a factor as court appeared to consider evidence on the mer-
its, but excluded it on basis of objective test); see also Blue Jeans Corp. v. Pinkerton, Inc.,
51 N.C. App. 137, 139, 275 S.E.2d 209, 211 (1981) (plaintiff's evidence of precontractual oral
negotiations not sufficient to create material issue of fact, as evidence failed to controvert
validity of writing).
1" See, e.g., Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Callahan, 127 F.2d 32, 34 (10th Cir. 1942)
(adopting fiction of mutual mistake to avoid unjust consequences of objective test); General
Warehousemen and Employees Union Local No. 636 v. J.C. Penney Co., 484 F. Supp. 130,
135, 137 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (espousing objective view, but examining subjective interpreta-
tions). One commentator has argued that courts should openly renounce the use of the ob-
jective theory instead of creating fictions to achieve a particular result. Note, supra note 26,
at 147.
"' See, e.g., Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Business Credit, Inc., 619 F.2d 1001, 1009-11
(3d Cir. 1980) (although extrinsic evidence may be admitted in some circumstances, "the
parties remain bound by the appropriate objective definition of the words they use to ex-
press their intent"); Chase Manhattan Bank v. First Marion Bank, 437 F.2d 1040, 1047 (5th
Cir. 1971) (parol evidence rule does not preclude admission of evidence dealing with course
of dealing and usage of trade); Keep Productions, Inc. v. Arlington Park Towers Hotel
Corp., 49 Ill. App. 3d 258, 263, 364 N.E.2d 939, 943, (1977) (parol evidence admissible to
clarify ambiguity).
Although Williston maintained that courts should employ the objective view of con-
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venting the impact of the parol evidence rule by finding ambiguity
in the written document, avoid directly challenging the validity of
the rule in its traditional form by professing to apply it. 13 6
The "objective test" is a term used by courts to reflect an ap-
plication of objective standards that are looser than some advo-
cated by the strict objectivists. The "test," however, is too amor-
phous. Judicial perceptions of the role of objectivity in formation
litigation are not uniform, and the various approaches are not al-
ways clearly explained or justified on policy grounds. The objective
test does not adequately deal with the realistic concerns of eviden-
tiary evaluation, assent, and reliance. The lack of definition and
vague preference for objectivity underlying the test give rise to an
unprincipled and haphazard approach to the resolution of forma-
tion questions. Objective standards have a place in contract adju-
dication, but the task is to define the role and limitations of such
standards in the light of contract policies.
VI. THE PROPER ROLE OF OBJECTIVITY IN CONTRACT
ADJUDICATION
The approach to objectivity must not be based on the falla-
cious assumption that manifestations of assent, rather than assent
itself, form the basis of contract. Although contracts can be formed
only through the medium of communication, contract law is pre-
mised on the belief that communicated conduct or utterances re-
present underlying contractual intent.' 37 That underlying intent
tracts when dealing with parol evidence, See 4 S. WILLISTON, supra note 66, § 1536, at 21, he
admitted that the trend today "is toward increasing liberality in the admission of parol
agreements", id. § 638, at 1045.
"I' See, e.g., Masterson v. Sine, 68 Cal. 2d 222, 225, 436 P.2d 561, 563, 65 Cal. Rptr. 545,
547 (1968). In Masterson, the plaintiff had conveyed his farm to the defendant with an
option to repurchase within 10 years. Id. at 224, 436 P.2d at 562, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 546. When
the plaintiff sought to exercise the option, the defendant contended that the option provi-
sion was too uncertain to be enforced. Id. at 223, 436 P.2d at 562, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 546. The
court held that the option was ambiguous and, therefore, admitted parol evidence. Id. at
225, 436 P.2d at 563, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 547. The dissent argued that the option was not
ambiguous and that the majority, by contradicting the written document, undermined the
parol evidence rule. See id. at 231, 436 P.2d at 567, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 551. (Burke, J.,
dissenting).
"' See 1 A. CORBIN, supra note 16, § 9, at 20-21. In contract law, conduct is observed as
an expression of the state of mind. Id. at 21. Since it is impossible to observe intentions and
states of mind directly, for judicial purposes it is conduct that is judged. See id. at 20; see
also 1 S. WILLISTON, supra note 31, § 9, at 48-49. A promise implies either communication or
some action indicating the intent of the promisor. Id.
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constitutes one of the elements of contract, and it may not be ig-
nored. Although factfinders often will find it possible to infer con-
tractual intent from overt conduct, and although that conduct
often will prove to be the best evidence of underlying intent, courts
should not pretend that an examination of external manifestations
represents the full scope of the factual inquiry into contract forma-
tion. Courts cannot treat everything beneath the surface of an ob-
jective manifestation as irrelevant. Beneath that surface may exist
information vital to a court's interpretation of the true meaning of
the communications between the parties.
A. The Role of Objectivity in Determining the Fact of Assent
In section III, it is argued that the states of mind of the par-
ties to a contract are facts that must be established before assent
can be found. 138 Because legal assent is determined in the light of
practical limitations on the formulation, expression, and proof of
the parties' states of mind, those states of mind are not necessarily
overriding or significant factors in deciding whether a binding rela-
tionship was formed. There is no argument advanced here for the
return to a subjectivity that demands a literal "meeting of the
minds." Nevertheless, fair evaluation of the evidence is possible
only when all the proffered facts, whether objective or subjective,
are placed before the factfinder to enable it to decide whether a
contract was concluded and on what terms. This principle should
apply even when the case involves manifestations in written form.
Subjective evidence may or may not be a highly relevant com-
ponent of the testimony.' 39 It is the function of the factfinder to
determine the most probable version of the transaction, and a
factfinder cannot make that decision accurately if evidence is ex-
cluded. Although there is undoubtedly some danger that the
factfinder might be misled or persuaded by questionable subjective
evidence, this is a risk inherent in the factfinding process generally,
and is hardly a good ground for imposing a general ban on subjec-
tive evidence. The factfinder does not have to believe the self-serv-
"I See supra note 40 and accompanying text; accord Victory Inv. Corp. v. Muskagee
Elec. Traction Co., 150 F.2d 889, 893 (10th Cir.) (cardinal rule in interpretation is to ascer-
tain parties' mutual intention), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 774 (1945); Verhagen v. Platt, 1 N.J.
85, 88, 61 A.2d 892, 893 (1948) (function of court is to ascertain intent of parties).
"' See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 1, § 2-3, at 24 (in certain situations sub-
jective intentions of party may be decisive element in resolution of case).
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ing subjective testimony of a party,1 4 and very often will be able
to disregard it without difficulty. 141 Such a scenario may give rise
to the argument that it is inefficient to permit the admission of
evidence that inevitably will be disbelieved, but that objection as-
sumes that generalized determinations of weight may be made
without hearing the evidence. 142 Although that assumption may
hold true in some cases, it is not valid when subjective evidence is
offered to explain contractual intentions. This type of subjective
evidence has too much potential significance to be dismissed in ad-
vance by a general exclusion.
In order to decide whether a contract was formed, therefore,
the factfinder must weigh not only evidence pertaining to objective
manifestations, but also evidence relating to the parties' underly-
ing intentions or interpretations of those manifestations. In some
cases, the factfinder may have to deliberate painstakingly over all
the evidence in order to distill the fact or terms of assent on the
balance of probabilities. In other cases, the task will be less diffi-
cult because the manifestation will have an obvious meaning. In
such cases, proof of the mere manifestation may create a prima
facie case 43 of assent. The apparent meaning of the manifestation
10 Wheeler v. Gerald, 288 Or. 467, 479, 605 P.2d 1339, 1345 (1980) (en banc); Eisele v.
Rood, 275 Or. 461, 464, 551 P.2d 441, 444 (1976); 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 16, § 538, at 63.
Professor Corbin observed that self-serving testimony concerning intent does not have to be
believed, and that it often can readily be rebutted if it is not true. Id. In addition, he argued
that a mechanical rule of exclusion is not likely to be the best tool for avoiding the danger of
self-serving testimony. Id. at 129. The issue, according to Corbin, should be one of weight,
rather than admissibility. Id.
141 See Whittier, supra note 65, at 442. Whittier recognized that a party could falsely
claim that he did not subjectively assent and thereby avoid the contract. Id. He noted,
however, that "in most cases" the triers of the fact "would not be misled. . . ." Id.; accord 3
A. CORBIN, supra note 16, § 538, at 63 (self-serving testimony will not necessarily mislead
trier of fact).
Some cases, while asserting an objective test, do appear to have evaluated subjective
evidence and rejected it because it lacked credibility. See, e.g., Praggastis v. Sandner, 40 Or.
App. 477, 484, 595 P.2d 520, 524 (1979); Dwelley v. Chesterfield, 88 Wash. 2d 331, 333, 560
P.2d 353, 355 (1972); see also NTA Nat'l, Inc. v. DNC Servs. Corp., 511 F. Supp. 210, 222
(D.D.C. 1981) (asserting objective test, court rejected subjective evidence of one party, but
the subjective evidence contradicted both objective evidence and more plausible subjective
evidence of other party); Seitzingers, Inc. v. National Bank of Washington, 490 F. Supp.
340, 346 (D.D.C. 1980) (on basis of objective test, court rejected subjective evidence that
could well have been excluded on grounds that it lacked credibility in light of other
evidence.
12 The efficiency argument is discussed more fully in § VII. See infra notes 169-180
and accompanying text.
'" There is a distinction between a presumption and a prima facie inference. C. Mc-
CORMICK, supra note 22, at 965 n.4. McCormick observed that the term "prima facie case" is
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may be so obvious that such meaning will be considered the only
tenable one, and assent on the basis of that meaning will be the
only plausible conclusion.' This, however, is a question of factual
evaluation to be made in each case, and does not give rise to a
generalized presumption that all manifestations of agreement must
be treated on their surface meaning.145 The normal rules relating
to the incidence and discharge of the burden of proof in a civil case
can adequately resolve these issues.'46
This flexible approach to the evaluation of evidence will not
result in the unhealthy preoccupation with subjectivity feared by
objectivists. That inclination toward the subjective would be held
in check by recognition of the principle that evidence of the actual
state of mind of the parties, rather than being the dispositive fac-
tor, 4 7 is merely an ingredient in the total factual context on which
often used in two senses and is, therefore, often misleading. Id. It may mean that the evi-
dence is sufficient to avoid a directed verdict against the party bearing the burden of proof,
or it may mean that the evidence is sufficient to shift the burden of proof-to create a
presumption. Id. The term prima facie case is used here to indicate evidence sufficient to get
to the jury, not evidence that creates a presumption. Cf. Transport Indem. Co. v. Sieb, 17
Neb. 253, 260, 132 N.W.2d 871, 875-76 (1965).
144 The apparent meaning of A's utterances in case 2 would probably be considered the
only tenable one, and, therefore, would be the basis of the parties' assent. Such a conclusion
would be less obvious in the case of B's nod to A in case 1.
145 But see, e.g., Hawes Office Sys. Inc. v. Wang Laboratories, 524 F. Supp. 610, 613
(E.D.N.Y. 1981) (contract presumed integrated when it states "on its face" that it encom-
passes total agreement); Board of Educ. v. Bullweber, 105 Ill. App. 3d 412, 416, 434 N.E.2d
448, 451 (1982) (when agreement is in writing, there is presumption that it is an expression
of parties' mutual intentions), aff'd, 96 Ill. 2d 520, 451 N.E.2d 858, 71 Ill. Dec. 704 (1983).
146 See Kidman v. White, 14 Utah 2d 142, 144, 378 P.2d 898, 899-900 (1963). In a con-
tract action, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing that the defendant contracted to
perform the obligations sought to be imposed. Id. at 899. The defendant may be bound only
to the extent of the terms of the contract expressed or reasonably implied. Id. Once the
plaintiff proves such an agreement, a prima facie case is made out and the burden of going
forward is shifted to the defendant to establish any facts that would diminish the plaintiff's
claim. Hurst v. Jackson, 134 Ga. App. 129, 129-30, 213 S.E.2d 511, 512 (1975).
1'7 The law clearly distinguishes underlying motivation or judgment from contractual
intent. See, e.g., Leitner v. Braen, 51 N.J. Super. 31, 38-39, 143 A.2d 256, 260 (1958). In
Leitner, the court refused to consider evidence by one of the parties relating to his subjec-
tive understanding of the amount of his commitment for sponsoring fees for a bowling team.
Id. at 38, 143 A.2d at 260. Although the court used the objective test as a justification for
disregarding the promissor's intent, a similar result would be reached through a full evalua-
tion of all the evidence; the mistake in underlying motive would not alter the fact that a
contractual relationship was intended on the terms expressed. For further examples of cases
in which unmanifested reservations of intent would be likely to be held irrelevant, even if
evidence of those intentions were admitted and included in the factual evaluation, see North
Star Center v. Sibley Bowl, Inc. 295 Minn. 424, 426, 205 N.W.2d 331, 332 (1973); Wheeler v.
White Rock Bottling Co., 229 Or. 360, 365, 366 P.2d 527, 529 (1961).
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a determination of the existence or the terms of a contract must be
based. 148 In short, there is no justification for using the objective
test to exclude subjective evidence or to create presumptions from
objective manifestations. The factfinder should be entrusted with
the task of evaluating all the evidence and distinguishing that
which is reliable and credible from that which is not. To the extent
that, by expressing a generalized preference for external evidence,
the objective test and the parol evidence rule are used to foreclose
that determination on the part of the factfinder, they fetter the
factual assessment of the court or jury by converting into a legal
rule what is really nothing more than an instinctive prejudice
against uncorroborated, self-serving evidence. 149
Objectivity should play no role in the stage of the trial during
which evidence is received. The use of objectivity should be con-
fined to the stage at which the testimony of the witnesses has been
concluded and the process of factual evaluation begins. The objec-
'1 A few cases illustrate the point that subjective evidence is merely part of the factual
context, and will not invariably overwhelm the other evidence. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Phillips,
178 Ind. 164, 166, 98 N.E. 868, 868 (1912). In Sullivan, a person offered a reward in the
course of his testimony in court to anyone who could uncover certain books of account that
had disappeared. Id. at 167, 98 N.E. at 869. When sued by the finder of the books, the
offeror contended that the offer was made with the intent that it last only for the length of
the proceedings, and with the motive that it enhance his credibility in court. Id. The court,
applying an objective standard, refused to take his unexpressed intent into account and held
him to the offer as expressed. Id. The result should be the same under an approach that
permits the evaluation of his intent as a matter of fact. His failure to express his intent in
the offer results in it not becoming a part of the contract; not because it is presumptively
irrelevant, but simply because it is not established by the evidence as forming one of the
agreed terms.
In Nieminen v. Pitzer, 281 Or. 53, 573 P.2d 1227 (1978), evidence of subjective intent
was admitted but rejected as irrelevant after an evaluation of all the evidence, on the basis
that the subjective intent could not stand in light of a clearly contrary manifestation of
assent, id. at 57-58, 573 P.2d at 1229.
In Frigaliment Importing Co. v. BNS Int'l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y.
1960), the court rejected the plaintiff's subjective understanding of the meaning of the word
"chicken" used in a written agreement because the plaintiff's interpretation of the word did
not accord with trade usage and other contextual evidence, see id. at 119-20. While the
court supported its finding with reference to the objective test, the case actually was re-
solved on the ground that the plaintiff's subjective understanding was factually irrelevent
because it did not become incorporated into the contract. Id. at 121.
49 Prejudice against subjective evidence is often apparent from the way it is described
in opinions. For example, in Reprosystems, B.V. v. SCM Corp., 522 F. Supp. 1257 (S.D.N.Y.
1981), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 727 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 110
(1984), the court stated that "[w]hat is looked to in determining whether an agreement has
been reached is not the parties after-the-fact professed subjective intent, but their objective
intent as manifested by their expressed words and deeds," 522 F. Supp. at 1275 (emphasis
added).
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tive test should be no more than an evaluative standard that is
used by the factfinder in the task of extracting from the evidence
its findings on the facts. It should be a tool for deciding upon the
plausibility of evidence and interpreting its meaning.
When a factfinder evaluates and interprets evidence, it em-
ploys a process that is partly deductive and partly intuitive. The
finder of fact is faced with a mix of objective and subjective evi-
dence that often is contradictory or unclear. It is the factfinder's
responsibility to decide not only what portions of the evidence are
credible, but also what the meaning of the evidence is. The
factfinder will approach the evidence through its own subjective
processes. '1 Since a purely subjective assessment by the factfinder
is undesirable, it is necessary for the law to provide an external
standard that can be used by the factfinder to keep its subjective
responses in check. By requiring the factfinder to evaluate evi-
dence on the basis of a reasonable interpretation of its plausibility
and meaning, the law provides a guide that enables the factfinder
consciously to control its own subjectivity, and to channel its
thinking in the direction of common standards. 5' In this way, a
clearly articulated and properly limited objective test enhances the
prospects of accurate factfinding. It permits the receipt of all evi-
dence and ensures evaluation in a way that is responsive to com-
munity expectations.
B. Objectivity as a Means of Resolving Reliance Issues
As stated in section III, the issue of actual assent is not the
only substantive issue in formation disputes. 2 In some cases, even
if it is clear that the manifestations of assent did not actually re-
flect the intent of the manifestor, there is a policy justification for
enforcing the putative relationship or term when the equities in
favor of the other party so dictate.153 This will occur when the
other party justifiably derived an unintended meaning from a man-
1o See Zell v. American Seating Co., 138 F.2d 641, 647 (2d Cir. 1943), rev'd, 322 U.S.
709 (1944). Judge Frank remarked in Zell that "when. . . we test. . . behavior by inquiring
how it appears to a 'reasonable man,' we must recognize, unless we wish to fool ourselves,
that although one area of subjectivity has been conquered, another remains unsubdued." Id.
... See Bronaugh, supra note 1, at 247.
'5' See supra text accompanying note 28. In addition to assent, accountability is an
issue. Id.
153 See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 59:1
CONTRACT ADJUDICATION
ifestation and built expectations on that interpretation. 5 4 There,
the court will have to balance the equities in favor of protecting
the reliance of one party against those in favor of not imposing
obligations on the other.
The objective theory, although based in part on the policy of
protecting reliance, failed to provide an adequate means of testing
for reliance. 55 Before holding a manifestor accountable for his con-
duct, a court, rather than giving its own objective interpretation of
such conduct, should evaluate the conduct in light of all the evi-
dence in order to reach a fair decision on whether it is appropriate
to hold the manifestor accountable. The states of mind of both the
manifestor and the second party are relevant factors to be consid-
ered by the court in determining the existence of grounds for
accountability. 56
At the conclusion of all the testimony, objective standards as-
sist in evaluating the evidence that tends to show the fact of reli-
ance.' 57 Once the evidence is evaluated, and the intentions of the
parties are established, objective standards serve further in deter-
mining the relative merits of the alleged intentions. Since reliance
must be justifiable, ' 5  and since the manifestor may be held ac-
countable only if he or she were in some way responsible for the
misapprehension, 59 the reasonableness of the conduct or appre-
hension of both parties will have to be judged by an external
"' See id.
,65 See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
x See 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 16, § 538, at 48. Corbin suggested that two inquiries are
crucial to the determination of accountability. Id. First, the court must inquire into the
meaning attributed to the manifestation by the party to whom it was addressed. Id. Second,
the court must probe the state of mind of the manifestor to determine whether he or she
knew or had reason to know that the other party had given the words such a meaning.
Accord United Teachers of Oakland v. Oakland Unified School Dist., 75 Cal. App. 3d 322,
324, 142 Cal. Rptr. 105, 110 (1977) (expressing as an important function the ascertainment
of the sense in which promissor believed that promisee understood his manifestation). The
correct inquiry, which has become a tentative working test, involves a weighing of all the
evidence in order to decide where the equities lie. See Sands v. Sands, 252 Md. 137, 138, 249
A.2d 187, 188 (1969); Embry v. Hargardine, McKittrick Dry Goods Co., 127 Mo. App. 383,
384, 105 S.W. 777, 778 (1907).
,11 See 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 16, § 538, at 73-75. The reasonable man test is only one
of many potential objective tests that may be applied to determine the fact upon which a
finding of reliance can be made. See id. Another such test is that suggested by the Restate-
ment of Contracts, which involves a determination of what the speaker, in using certain
words, should reasonably have expected the other party to have understood them to mean.
See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS, § 227 comment a (1932).
168 See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
'o See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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standard.
This approach is not likely to place an undue burden on the
adjudication process. The absence of presumptive reliance will not
necessarily involve a more complex factual inquiry into the exis-
tence of actual reliance. In some transactions, the fact of reliance
will emerge clearly from the very nature of the transaction, per-
haps creating a prima facie showing of reliance. 160 The clearer the
manifestation, and the more obvious its meaning, the less the per-
son acting on the manifestation will have to show to establish such
a prima facie case. For example, in Sutton v. First National Bank
of Crossville,'6' a bank had included in its standard form loan ap-
plication a provision relating to credit life insurance. 162 The appli-
cant was required, when signing the loan application, to indicate
by checking the appropriate box whether he desired the credit life
insurance, and had checked the box indicating a desire for insur-
ance. 13 He subsequently died, and the issue became whether the
bank had been contractually obliged to have furnished such insur-
ance.16  The court had little trouble finding reliance on the provi-
sion in the application.'65 Even though the applicant was dead and
unable to testify to his subjective understanding, the clear import
of the form, together with the applicant's signature, in the absence
of contrary indications was sufficient evidence of reliance in the
context of the transaction. 166
160 See supra note 145. In certain types of specialized transactions, other policy consid-
erations-for example, the protection of parties outside the immediate transaction-might
dictate the need for special rules to facilitate commercial practices. An obvious example of
this type of special policy is found in the area of negotiable instruments. The negotiable
nature of commercial paper requires that negotiable instruments are capable of being taken
at face value as they pass in commerce. In that area of the law, a strict objectivity is there-
fore appropriate, and it does not offend contract policy generally to provide, as regards re-
mote parties, that signature gives rise to a conclusive presumption of assent. See, e.g., Utah
Valley Bank v. Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060, 1061-62 (Utah 1981).
161 620 S.W.2d 526 (Tenn. 1981).
162 Id. at 527.
163 Id.
..4 Id. at 528.
165 Id. at 530-31.
166 Id. at 530. Approaches similar to that taken in Sutton are adopted in other areas of
litigation involving the accountability of providers of standard forms. See, e.g., H.C. Price
Co. v. Compass Ins. Co., 483 F. Supp. 171, 175 (N.D. Tex. 1980) (ambiguity in contract
language is resolved against the party who could have avoided ambiguity); First Nw. Nat'l
Bank v. Crouch, 287 N.W.2d 151, 153 (Iowa 1981) (courts frown upon adhesion contracts).
Reliance also may be established objectively if one of the parties overtly manifests as-
sent. See, e.g., Nieminen v. Pitzer, 281 Or. 53, 56, 573 P.2d 1227, 1228 (1977) (evidence that
plaintiff did not understand settlement even though she nodded her head in assent when it
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In other cases, the facts might well compel a contrary conclu-
sion. For example, when a mass contractor argues for the enforce-
ment of the terms of a standard form contract, the court should
not treat the other party's signature on the standard form as creat-
ing a presumption, or even a prima facie case, of assent to the
form. Furthermore, the form should not generate a prima facie
case of or a presumption of reliance on the manifestation in favor
of the supplier of the form. Given the circumstances that usually
surround the signature of standard form agreements, it is not at all
obvious that a signature represents assent, or that the supplier of
the form believed or was justified in believing that it did.167
In both cases described above, the perceptions and under-
standings of the parties to the transaction are relevant, indeed es-
sential, components of the foundation on which a decision on ac-
countability is grounded. Moreover, careful scrutiny of the facts
surrounding reliance will not adversely affect the security of trans-
action; as long as actual reliance is protected, the interests of
transactional security are adequately served.
In summary, both the question of assent and the question of
reliance are essentially factual issues. In resolving formation dis-
putes, the court must base its decision to enforce an apparent con-
tract or contract term on either a finding of actual assent, or, when
actual assent is not shown, a finding that an obligation should be
enforced on the ground of accountability. The standard of reasona-
bleness serves as a means of evaluating evidence and, in determin-
ing accountability, as a means of deciding whether reliance justifies
the imposition of an obligation on a party who has manifested ap-
parent assent. If the objective test is elevated beyond these func-
tions, it deflects the factfinding process and compromises the abil-
ity of the court to adjudicate the dispute accurately, thereby
undermining fundamental contract policy.
was being read, admitted, but not given any weight).
M6 See Weaver v. American Oil Co., 257 Ind. 458, 464, 276 N.E.2d 144, 148 (1972);
Frame v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 20 Cal. App. 3d 668, 672, 97 Cal.
Rptr. 811, 813 (1971). Although a signature indicates assent, many standardized forms today
are deemed unconscionable and against public policy because the signer of such a contract is
at a significant disadvantage to the party providing the form. See Weaver, 257 Ind. at 464,
276 N.E.2d at 148. In such a case, the party who submitted the contract must clearly show
that the other party understood and assented to the unconscionable clauses. Id. Notwith-
standing such a showing, the court may be reluctant to enforce the contract. Id.; see also
Blum & Wellman, supra note 29, at 929-31 (discussing significance of clauses deemed to be
against public policy).
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VII. OBJECTIVITY AND JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY
One of the principal rationales for an objective approach to
formation issues is the perceived value of that approach in promot-
ing certainty, curtailing the factual inquiry, and permitting the
court to control the process of contract adjudication.' The prefer-
ence for objectivity is based in part on the theory that self-serving,
subjective evidence is often less reliable and less convincing than
evidence of external conduct, especially when there is an apparent
conflict between intent and action.169 It is reasoned that because
subjective evidence is usually self-serving and difficult to corrobo-
rate, 70 its admission consumes judicial time, and might endanger
the fact-finding process by misleading the trier of fact.17 The ar-
gument might be made, therefore, that in order to simplify and
shorten trials subjective evidence should be excluded in advance.
Such an argument must be approached with caution. Although
subjective evidence often is more likely to be untrustworthy than
objective evidence, 7 1 it is not clear that subjective evidence is so
consistently unreliable that it unquestionably deserves never to be
heard. The factual inquiry should not be truncated, by declaring
an entire class of evidence valueless, merely on the basis of conven-
166 See supra notes 50 & 132 and accompanying text.
169 See, e.g., Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Business Credit, 619 F.2d 1001, 1009 (3d Cir.
1980) (courts lack "psychic power" to determine subjective intentions of party and thus rely
on objective manifestations of intent); Lubrication & Maintenance, Inc. v. Union Resources
Co., 522 F. Supp. 1078, 1081 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (unexpressed subjective intentions must give
way to individual's actions and surrounding circumstatnces); Mullen v. Christiansen, 642
P.2d 1345, 1350 (Alaska 1982) (subjective evidence is both self-serving and lacking probative
value).
1"0 See supra note 169 and accompanying text. Admittedly, there are good reasons to
view subjective evidence with some degree of skepticism; for instance, subjective evidence is
easy to fabricate and difficult to evaluate. See 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 110 (1881); see
also Mullen v. Christiansen, 642 P.2d 1345, 1350 (Alaska 1982) (evidence of subjective in-
tentions can be used for self-serving ends and lacks probative value).
" See, e.g., Peterson v. Culver Educ. Found. 402 N.E.2d 448, 453 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980)
(promisor's motive for breaching contract is irrelevant because promisee will be compen-
sated for all damages resulting from breach); Kabil Devs. Corp. v. Mignot, 279 Or. 151, 158,
566 P.2d 505, 509 (1977) (when jury was carefully instructed that their decision could not be
based on parties' private intentions, admission of one party's subjective intent did not mis-
lead jury).
It should be noted that in some cases, even objective evidence is subject to problems of
inaccuracy, unreliability or fabrications. See 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 18, § 12, at 297.
Thus, these problems do not relate to the subjective evidence. See, e.g., Wilt v. Waterfield,
273 S.W.2d 290, 295 (Mo. 1954) (ostensibly valid liquidated damages clause deemed invalid
because it had the potential to be inaccurate).
172 See supra notes 170-71.
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tional wisdom.
Subjective evidence sometimes is convincing, and can be dis-
counted when it is not. Many courts, while professing the tradi-
tional doctrine in favor of objectivity, have displayed a squeamish-
ness about ignoring subjective evidence. 173 Even courts that apply
the objective test are known to sneak a look at whatever subjective
evidence is available.174 Some courts manage to hear the subjective
evidence without abandoning their avowed objectivism by finding
that the objective evidence is ambiguous or unclear. 17 5 Others,
frankly recognizing the value of hearing subjective evidence, have
been reluctant to exclude it, even when the manifestation appeared
to be relatively clear.176 In the absence of ambiguity, objectivist
courts frequently have allowed the admission of subjective evi-
dence either by stating that the case is exceptional, 7 or without
M See, e.g., Zamore v. Whitten, 395 A.2d 435, 440 , 443 (Me. 1978) (mutual assent to
contract must be manifested, but contract action fails when there is no evidence of intent to
enter binding mutual obligation); State v. Sampson, 387 A.2d 213, 216 (Me. 1978) (in case of
criminal extortion contract, it is proper to find both that agreement existed and that victim
had no intent to fulfill it even though objective manifestation was test); Hamilton v. Boyce,
234 Minn. 290, 292, 48 N.W.2d 172, 174 (1951) (exception to objective manifestations test
when one party knows other does not intend to be bound).
171 See, e.g., Wallace v. Rogier, 182 Ind. App. 303, 304, 395 N.E.2d 297, 301 (1979) (hid-
den intentions not examined, but evidence of sham contract is admissible to defeat action
on contract); Capital Warehouse Co. v. McGill-Warner-Farnham Co., 276 Minn. 108, 114,
149 N.W.2d 31, 35-36 (1967) (objective manifestation is essential to making contract, but
whole transaction should be examined to determine intent of parties); City of Everett v.
Estate of Sumstad, 95 Wash. 2d 853, 855-56, 631 P.2d 366, 367-88 (1981) (en banc) (al-
though "objective manifestation theory" was followed, sale was held binding because buyer
was aware of rule that all sales were final).
M7 See, e.g., Ruhsam v. Ruhsam, 110 Ariz 326, 327, 518 P.2d 576, 577 (1974) (en banc)
(intentions of parties at time of contracting are relevant and should be considered if terms
of agreement are unclear); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co.,
69 Cal. 2d 33, 37, 442 P.2d 641, 645-46, 69 Cal. Rptr. 561, 566 (1968) (any rational attempt
to interpret an agreement requires at least a preliminary consideration of all credible evi-
dence offered to prove intention of parties); Kronisch v. Howard Say. Inst., 154 N.J. Super.
576, 581, 382 A.2d 64, 69 (1977) (if terms of agreement are ambiguous, testimony may be
admitted to determine intent of parties), afl'd in part, rev'd in part, 161 N.J. Super. 592,
392 A.2d 178 (1978).
171 See, e.g., First Nw. Nat'l Bank v. Crouch, 287 N.W.2d 151, 153 (Iowa 1980) (al-
though there was no dispute about meaning of words on note, court admitted evidence re-
garding intent of parties); Kabil Devs. Corp. v. Mignot, 279 Or. 151, 153-54, 566 P.2d 505,
508-09 (1977) (party's own view of transaction should be admitted as evidence); cf. supra
note 172 (Corbin approach to the parol evidence rule). Words are unclear symbols in and of
themselves) and therefore always require interpretation. See Matthews v. Drew Chem.
Corp., 475 F.2d 146, 148 (5th Cir. 1973).
l77 See, e.g., O'Neill v. Corporate Trustees, Inc., 376 F.2d 818, 820 (5th Cir. 1967) (ex-
ceptional nature was that one party knew of the actual intent of the other party even
though objective manifestations did not reflect such intent); Bernstein v. Kapneck, 290 Md.
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any justification or explanation at all.178 Moreover, it is not uncom-
mon, in cases in which the objective test is applied, for the subjec-
tive evidence to be declared inadmissible by an appeals court only
after it has been heard at trial. 79 When evidence is excluded at
this stage, it cannot be said that the exclusion has saved any time
or insulated the factfinding process.
The indications are that, although the objective test may have
resulted in the exclusion of evidence and the saving of time in a
portion of cases, it has failed to do so in a substantial number of
cases. It is possible that arguments in favor of a consistently ap-
plied objectivity will never succeed simply because courts will al-
ways find it difficult to ignore evidence that is temptingly perti-
nent, and that may contain one of the keys to resolving the case.
The more a court believes it is bound to follow objectivist doctrine,
the more likely the court will manipulate that doctrine in order to
circumvent it without repudiating it.
In summary, while a rule excluding subjective evidence would
likely result in the saving of some court time, it is not at all clear
that the rule is a practical one. Even if it could be applied consist-
ently, the rule is not justifiable unless it is clear that the benefit of
enhanced efficiency outweighs the cost of compromising the quality
of the factual inquiry designed to effectuate fundamental contract
policy.
452, 456, 430 A.2d 602, 605 (1981) (doctrine of mistake is commonly used to avoid unwanted
results of strict objective view); Shrum v. Zeltwanter, 559 P.2d 1384, 1387 (Wyo. 1977)
(cases involving duress, fraud, or mistake often act to relax consequences of objective
theory).
178 See, e.g., Tentindo v. Locke Lake Colony Ass'n, 120 N.H. 593, 598, 419 A.2d 1097,
1101 (1980) (trial court must determine intentions of parties based on evidence as a whole
regardless of exceptional circumstances); Phillip v. Gallant, 62 N.Y. 256, 262-63 (1875) (sub-
jective evidence admitted without justification); Nieminen v. Pitzer, 281 Or. 53, 56, 573 P.2d
1227, 1228 (1978) (despite court's refusal to recognize defendant's secret intention in nod-
ding her head, testimony of defendant was admitted).
17 See, e.g., American Sumatra Tobacco Corp. v. Willis, 170 F.2d 215, 217 (5th Cir.
1948) (trial court's admission of testimony regarding entitlement to crops is reversible er-
ror); Hotchkiss v. National City Bank, 200 F. 287, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) (trial testimony as to
creation of a trust relationship is inadmissible since acts did not show such a relationship),
aff'd, 201 F. 664 (2d Cir. 1912), aff'd, 231 U.S. 50 (1913) ; Mayo v. Andress, 373 So. 2d 620,
623-24 (Ala. 1979) (testimony at trial that defendant never meant to assure apartments
would be built on property is inadmissible); Powel v. Burke, 178 Conn. 384, 387, 423 A.2d
97, 99 (1979) (court's contract interpretation reflects parties' objective, not subjective, in-
tent); Langer v. Stegerwald Lumber Co., 262 Wis. 383, 388, 55 N.W.2d 389, 392 (1952) (se-
cret intention of defendant's officers introduced at trial is not binding on plaintiffs); cf. First
Nw. Nat'l Bank v. Crouch, 287 N.W.2d 151, 153 (Iowa 1980) (parol evidence admitted at




This Article has sought to describe the policies that dictate
the content of substantive and procedural rules employed by
courts in adjudicating formation issues. The consensual nature of
the contract relationship gives rise to a strong policy in favor of
recognizing that contracts contain both an internal and an external
element. The fundamental policy that mandates the enforcement
of contracts demands that courts enforce as contracts only those
relationships in which an adequate level of assent is factually
demonstrated. Contract policy also demands that protection be ac-
corded to the proprietary interests of those who justifiably have
built expectations in reliance on the apparently contractual behav-
ior of others. These policies co-exist with the general policy that
courts should conduct litigation as efficiently and accurately as
possible. Courts that do not focus on these goals endanger basic
contract policy by increasing the risk of unprincipled dispute
resolution.
The objective theory, the objective test, and the parol evidence
rule have been justified at different times on the ground that they
are designed to serve one or more of the foregoing policies. An ex-
amination of the content and application of these doctrines, how-
ever, brings their justification into question. They appear unneces-
sary in the advancement of formation policies, and case law
demonstrates that they are not, and never have been, applied in a
way that balances and accommodates the policy considerations un-
derlying the resolution of formation disputes. The sagging vitality
of the parol evidence rule, and the incoherent and inconsistent ap-
plication of the objective test, exacerbate this problem.
Objective standards, to be sure, do serve a useful function in
formation litigation by injecting common standards into the pro-
cess of dispute resolution, both in the area of factual evaluation
and in the task of judging the justifiability of behavior. Their gen-
eralized use in the reception of evidence, however, is not tenable. If
they are to resolve formation issues in an articulate and principled
way, courts must avoid rejecting subjective evidence through blind
adherence to the objective test and the parol evidence rule. Courts
must permit the factfinding process to proceed so that contract
formation disputes may be adjudicated in accordance with under-
lying policy.
1984]
